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Abstract of thesis entitled: Self- Nature Relationships Revisited: Deep Ecology, 
Eco-feminism, and Wang Wei's Landscape Poetry 
This thesis aims at responding to the problems of deep ecology's and ecofeminism's 
proposed self/ nature relationship with reference to Wang Wei's object- oriented 
landscape poetry. Issues like how deep ecology and ecofeminism understand human/ 
nature alienation as a problem in the current environmental crisis, the power structure 
between human and nature, how human/ nature dominations are in relation to other 
oppressions such as men/ women, and how gender is important to the issues of 
environmental discussions are included. In discussing the deep ecology- ecofeminism 
debate, the contents of deep ecology and ecofeminism, their general disagreements, 
and their respective inherent problems are also revealed. In this thesis, focus will be 
mainly put on the deep ecology and ecofeminism proposed model of self/ nature 
relationships, that is, the principle of Self Realization proposed by deep ecology and 
the relational self proposed by ecofeminism. I argue in the thesis that while Self 
Realization has been criticized by ecofeminism as masculinist, ecofeminism's 
relational self is equally doubtful in establishing an unproblematic ground. It is where 
the specific self/ nature relationship found in Wang Wei's object- oriented landscape 
poetry contributes in this thesis. I argue that the self/ nature relationship found in 
Wang Wei's object- oriented landscape poetry, which is non- masculinist, inter-related 
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Realization)和生態女性主義所提出的「關係我」（the relational self)。在「自我實 
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Facing contemporary environmental destructions and problems, many have 
called for actions and new policies. Some have called for a change in governmental 
policy, some have urged for a philosophical foundation to support activism, and some 
have urged for a personal change in ecological consciousness. Deep ecology and 
ecofeminism are two major discourses in environmental discussions. Deep ecology 
traces the environmental crisis in a philosophical approach, urging for a 
transformation in personal consciousness. The "deepness" in deep ecology is in 
contrast to the “shallowness” of environmentalism. As deep ecologists believe, 
technological solutions to the current environmental problems are only taking 
slop-gap measures, only a transformation in personal consciousness is the ultimate 
solution. Hence, deep ecologists advocate Self Realization as a new self/ nature 
communication model to reform the current problematic master/ slave self/ nature 
relationship model. Ecofeminism, on the other hand, tries to apply feminist analysis to 
environmental discussions. Ecofeminism believes that the human/ nature oppression 
cannot be analyzed independently, but should be understood together with the men/ 
women oppression, as the two oppressions are interdependent. Due to the different 
groundings of these two discourses, severe disagreements and debates are to be 
expected. Analyzing the debates and disagreements between the two is far from 
meaningless. The debates include the most fundamental problems of the 
environmental discussions, such as how we can understand the relations between 
human and current environmental destructions, and the position of human in relation 
10 nature. These are all urgent questions, deserving our real attentions. What I am 
trying to do in this thesis is to look closely into the "deep ecology- ecofeminism 
debate"', that is, the general disagreements and controversies between deep ecology 
and ecofeminism, and bring a new perspective to these disagreements with reference 
to Wang Wei's object- oriented landscape poetry^. As the debate is rather unsystematic, 
in the thesis, I try to tease out some of the important issues from the debate, 
demonstrate their problems and disagreements, and suggest a perspective that sheds 
new light on the problems. As deep ecology and ecofeminism argue vigorously about 
the fundamental problems of today's environmental crisis, the thesis starts with their 
different views on the "causes" of the environmental destruction. 
The whole deep- ecology ecofeminism debate was initiated by Ariel Salleh's 
(1984) essay, "Deeper than deep ecology: the eco-feminist connection", from where 
Sail eh claims that ecofeminism is having a "deeper" understanding of environmental 
problems than deep ecology. She criticizes deep ecology as being masculinist in the 
essay, arguing that, for example, deep ecology overlooks the implicit masciilinism in 
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the term "Man" (p. 340). The debate then began and developed in an unsystematic 
way, as Eugene Hargrove notes, "deep ecologists and ecofeminists are as yet not even 
completely in agreement about what they are disagreeing about, this debate can be 
expected to be rather lengthy" (1989, p. 3-4). Yet, key issues can still be identified in 
the debate. Ecofeminist Karen Warren in her essay, "Ecofeminist Philosophy and 
Deep Ecology" (cl999), tries to summarize the deep ecology- ecofeminism debate. 
The first issue, anthropocentrism (human- centeredness) versus androcentrism, is 
one of the most controversial and important issues in the debate as it discusses the 
main problems or causes of current environmental crisis. As ecofeminist Plumwood 
states, “[t]he critique of anthropocentrism or human domination of nature is a new and 
in my view inestimably important contribution to our understanding of Western 
society, its history, its current problems, and its structures of domination" (Plumwood, 
p. 70, 1994) Hence, the anthropocentrism/ androcentrism debate provides an 
important framework in understanding the problems of environmental crisis and more 
importantly, the power structures of domination, which serves as an important 
background throughout the whole thesis. 
Both deep ecology and ecofeminism identify anthropocentrism as a problem in 
current environmental discourse, yet they interpret the term differently. Deep ecology 
holds that environmental problems are due to human- centeredness in the sense that 
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non-humans^ are only seen as instruments, resulting in a master- slave relation 
between humans and non-humans. Hence, according to deep ecology, to uphold the 
intrinsic value of nature is an important step in breaking down the master- slave 
relation between humans and nature. 
On the other hand, ecofeminism (which holds that environmental discussions are 
feminist issues) also identifies anthropocentrism as a central problem in the current 
environmental crisis but reads the problem differently than deep ecology. For 
ecofeminists, the problem of anthropocentrism lies not merely in viewing non-humans 
as instruments, but also in the diialistic structure underlying this instrumental view of 
nature. Furthermore, as almost all ecofeminists agree, this dualistic relation between 
human/ nature cannot be understood alone. For all oppressions, whether on grounds of 
class, race or gender, are inter-linked and reinforcing. They cannot be understood and 
solved independently. Understanding these oppressions interdependently is the only 
way to spell out the real problems of these oppressions. To distinguish from deep 
ecology's understanding of anthropocentrism, ecofeminist Pliimwood (1997) names 
this reading of anthropocentrism the liberation model of anthropocentrism, while 
many other ecofeminists straightforwardly call it androcentrism (male- centeredness). 
In a nutshell, then, ecofeminism. as an attempt to address environmental issues with 
feminist analysis, believes thai the oppression of nature and the oppression of women 
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(and other oppressions) are not separate issues but inter-related. Furthermore, many 
ecofeminists believe that the connection between women and nature, either 
historically or essentially, is so important that it provides an alternative to the 
conlempomry masculinist dualistic model. For instance, the egalitarianism found in 
matriarchic society is held up as a better model than the masculinist dualistic model. 
Motherhood and childcare are seen as important sources of alternative values in 
establishing the ideal egalitarian and peaceful society. 
Following from these different understandings of "anthropocentrism" as a key 
problem in environmental issues, deep ecology and ecofeminism propose two 
different accounts of self/ nature relation to address the problem. Deep ecology 
proposes Self Realization to re-establish the lost link between self/ nature relation and 
re-affirm the intrinsic value of nature. Of the many principles proposed by deep 
ecology, including bioegalitarianism and the deep ecology platform (see chapter one), 
Self Realization is the most important and significant principle, as this is one of the 
most crucial advocation of deep ecology, and the deep ecology- ecofeminism debate 
over Self Realization “shows the main differences between the two ideologies" 
(Kheel, 1990, p. 129). As later chapters will show, to ecofeminism, the Self 
Realization advocated by deep ecology is in fact still masculinist in that it fails to 
identify the "real" problem of “anlhi-opocentrism,，，that is, the highly problematical 
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underlying dual ism/ To escape from such masculinism, deep ecology has to 
acknowledge both continuity and difference in the human- nature relation, which the 
proposed notion of Self Realization fails to do. 
Significantly, though ecofeminism provides a detailed criticism of Self 
Realization, it fails to provide an adequate account of the self/ nature relationship 
itself. Relational self, ecofeminism's proposed model of self/ nature relationship, 
successfully highlights the important elements of a new self/ nature relation that 
overcomes the problem of masculinism, but fails to offer a demonstratable ground for 
such a relation. Short of essentializing the women- nature connection, ecofeminists 
simply do not explain how this relational self can come into being. Neither do they 
explain how the relational self is related to the women- nature connection, which 
ecofeminists have stressed as important repeatedly. This vagueness in the ecofeminist 
account of the relational self suggests fundamental problems that ecofeminists are 
unable to solve. The women- nature connection that is one of the basic groundings of 
ecofeminism is indeed highly problematical. For instance, claims of a women- nature 
connection may easily fall into the problems of the universalization and generalization 
of women's experiences, which overlook key difference that some ecofeminists are 
aware of, such as that between whites and blacks. As we will see in the thesis, to posit 
a necessary women- nature connection as the grounding of the relational self is simply 
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impossible and problematical. It is in light of this impasse that the specific self/ nature 
relation found in Wang Wei's object- oriented landscape poetry is valuable in 
providing a new perspective on the relational self. As we will see, the selected poems 
manage to escape the problems of masculinism that ecofeminism identifies in deep 
ecology's proposal of Self Realization on the one hand, and offer a grounded 
conception of the self- nature relation that parallels ecofeminism,s understanding of 
the relational self on the other hand. 
Before proceeding to the concrete arguments in different chapters, two important 
words need to be clarified first in this thesis, namely "human" and " se l f . Throughout 
this thesis, “self’ is distinguished from “human" in the sense that self refers to an 
individual while '‘human” refers to a general category of "human beings", as relative 
to non-humans. For instance, in the context of Wang's object- oriented poems, the self 
refers to the poet rather than the general category of humans. Yet, despite this 
distinction, there may not be a significant difference between the two, especially when 
discussing the human (as general) or self (as an individual) relationship with nature. It 
is because, as we will see, both human as a group and self as an individual can relate 
to nature in the same way. The self/ nature relationship discussed in chapter two 
analyzes how each human as an individual relates with nature. In this respect, the two 
words are almost interchangeable and synonymous in the thesis. 
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The chapters 
To begin, chapter one will focus on the anthropocentrism/ androcentrism debate, 
where major differences between deep ecology and ecofeminism are clearly revealed. 
The meanings of deep ecology and ecofeminism are also discussed in this context. 
The chapter will discuss how deep ecology and ecofeminism understand the problem 
of “anthropocentrism，，differently. We will also see how the women- nature 
connection is important to ecofeminism and how this women- nature connection 
poses problems for ecofeminism. 
Chapter two will discuss and analyze the "solution" proposed by deep ecology 
and ecofeminism respectively. We will first examine deep ecology's self/ nature 
account. Self Realization, its content and then ecofeminists' criticisms on it. These 
criticisms become more explicit and clear when we juxtapose Self Realization with 
the relational selfhood, ecofeminism's conception of self/ nature relation. This chapter 
ends with an account of how the problems of women- nature connection render 
ecofeminism's understanding of the relational self fundamentally problematical. 
In chapter three, I will bring in an account of Wang's object- oriented landscape 
poetry and discuss how the specific self/ nature relationship portrayed therein can 
contribute to the debate. I argue that Wang's account provides a non- masciilinist 
account of the self in relation to nature that parallels ecofeminism's notion of the 
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relational self without assuming a problematic women- nature connection, hence 
bringing a new light to the issues of human- nature relation at the heart of the deep 
ecology ecofeminism debate. 
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Chapter one The anthropocentrism/ androcentrism debate 
The anthropocentrism/ androcentrism debate mainly concerns the disagreement 
between deep ecology and ecofeminism over whether anthropocentrism (human-
centeredness) or androcentrism (male- centeredness) is the real cause of 
environmental problems. It is important to point out that the anthropocentrism/ 
androcentrism debate discussed here focuses specifically on how deep ecology and 
ecofeminism differ in understanding the human/ nature alienation as a destructive 
force. By no means am I suggesting an anthropocentrism/ androcentrism dualism, nor 
am I suggesting that either anthropocentrism or androcentrism is the only root cause 
to the problems. What I seek to do here is to give a detailed account of the 
anthropocentrism/ androcentrism debate so as to clarify key differences between deep 
ecology and ecofeminism. 
Since the deep ecology- ecofeminism debate began with the latter's criticisms of 
the former, in this chapter, we will follow ecofeminism's critique of deep ecology's 
understanding of "anthropocentrism". We will examine on what grounds ecofeminism 
criticizes and disagrees with deep ecology. This will be followed by a discussion of 
the implicit problems of ecofeminism's own specific groundings, which, as I argue, 
render the self/ nature relationship proposed by ecofeminism highly problematical. 
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Deep ecology 一 the critique of anthropocentrism in environmentalism 
Anthropocentrism, or human-centeredness, has been highly problematical to 
many green thinkers. Deep ecology, seeing anthropocentrism as the culprit of the 
contemporary environmental crisis, grounds their discourse on critiquing 
anthropocentrism. 
The deep ecology movement was first initiated by Ariie Naess in 1973 to go 
beyond anthropocentrism in environmentalism. "Deep Ecology" literatures include 
writings by green thinkers like Arne Naess, David Rothenburg, Bill Devall, George 
Sessions and Fox Warwick. The concept of "Deep Ecology" varies from Naess's 
Ecosophy 丁 to Warwick's transpersonal ecology/'' The meaning of "deep" in the term 
deep ecology lies in the contrast to the "shallowness" of environmentalism. According 
to deep ecology, environmentalism is a movement that focuses only on the 
well-beings of people in the developed countries. An example of such focus is 
environmentalism's preference for immediate solutions such as pollution control 
device to deal with environmental problems of pollution. For instance, resolving the 
problem of pollution relies heavily on technological development to reduce pollution 
to a satisfactory level, instead of having a transformation in living style and habit or 
an internal change in consciousness on treating non-humans. In short, as Naess notes, 
environmentalism gives preferences and priorities to sustainable economic and 
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industrial growth of the developed countries rather than considering the values of 
non-humans as well. Deep ecology criticizes this "shallow ecology" for placing 
humans at the center of the world, seeing non-humans as mere instruments that are 
valuable only in terms of their contributions to the economic growth and development 
of the developed societies. 
To deep ecology, this kind of environmentalist thinking — placing humans at the 
center, concerning only about human's well-beings, and seeing non-humans as merely 
instrumental — is anthropocentric and such anthropocentrism is the root cause of 
environmental problems. Anthropocentrism legitimates ecological destructions and all 
kinds of human dominations. Thus war and science's actions (towards non-humans) 
can all be legitimated in the name of "humanity" or simply "man". Neil Armstrong's 
moon walk, for instance, has been glorified in the name of humanity and celebrated as 
a break-through in human history, a “giant leap for mankind" (Fox, 2001 p.229). In 
this view, a master/ slave relationship is formed between human and nature, with 
humans at the center and non-humans valued only in accordance with human needs 
and interests. Some deep ecologists trace this anthropocentrism to the Judeo-
Christian tradition and the Cartesian mind/ body dualism which attributes soul only to 
human and relegates non-humans to pure matters (Sessions, 1995). This western 
dominant woiidview places humans at the center as master of the world. It sets human 
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and nature apart, reducing non-humans to mere instruments. 
Against this anthropocentric view of non-humans as instruments, deep ecology 
proposes a "non- anthropocentric" environmental discourse. A key version of this 
discourse advances two concepts, relational total field and biospherical egalitarianism 
(bioegalitarianism), to place human in relational terms with nature (Naess, 1989). 
Relational total field aims at reconnecting humans with non-humans. Instead of 
viewing humans as separated from and master of the world, relational total field 
situates humans in the world and sets everything in relational terms. That is, the 
definition of A is relational to B, and A and B will not be the same without these 
relations. Specifically, the understanding of humans cannot be dissociated from their 
relations with non-humans. Detaching humans from these relations results in the 
current dominant model of master-slave relations with non-humans. Bioegalitarianism 
stresses that non-humans have '"equal rights to live and blossom” as humans (Naess, 
1989, p. 28). To make this claim is to highlight the intrinsic value of nature and hence 
to go against the instrumental view of environmentalism. In other words, 
bioegalitarianism suggests that when humans realize the intrinsic value of 
non-humans, they will come to respect non-humans as living entities. Non humans 
will not be regarded as pure matters, and humans will no longer place themselves as 
the center of the world/) Thus, Deep ecology's highlighting the intrinsic value of 
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non-humans and re-situating humans as a knot of the organic web attempts to 
obliterate human-centeredness and go beyond anthropocentrism. 
Building on the non- anthropocentric vision of the relational total field and 
bioegalitarianism, Naess further proposes Self Realization as a means to achieve the 
new human- nature relation, that is, to reconnect human with nature and to 
acknowledge the intrinsic value of nature. This principle of Self Realization will be 
discussed in detail in chapter two. In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss how 
ecofeminism disagrees with and responds to deep ecology's understanding of 
"anthropocentrism" as the “real cause" of environmental problems. This will bring out 
fundamental disagreements and differences between deep ecology and ecofeminism. 
Significantly, deep ecology sees anthropocentrism as the underlying causes of 
not only environmental domination but also all oppressions (Fox, 2001). According to 
deep ecology, anthropocentrism legitimates the superiority of the dominant group. It 
regulates what a human is and what constitutes the essence of being a human, which 
allows men, whites and capitalists to see themselves as “more fully human than 
others,，： 
[T]o be human" also means to be 'more fully human than others, such as 
women... the "lower" class, blacks, and non-Westerners... The cultural spell of 
anthropocentrism has been considered sufficient to justify not only moral 
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superiority..., but also all kinds of domination within human society - let alone 
domination of the obviously nonhuman world. (Fox, p. 229) 
Just as anthropocentrism sets nature as pure matter, then, it also sets women, blacks 
and workers as inferior and subordinate. Hence, to deep ecology, anthropocentrism is 
an adequate account of all oppressions, and ecofeminism and other discourses can be 
subsumed under deep ecology's effort to overcome anthropocentrism. As Fox puts it, 
there is simply no difference between deep ecology and ecofeminism: 
[i]t becomes difficult to see any significant difference between what they call 
ecofeminism, green socialism, and so on and what others call deep ecology (such 
differences as remain are simply differences of theoretical flavor and emphasis 
rather than differences of substance). (Fox, 2001, p. 231) 
In this view, the only difference found in deep ecology and ecofeminism is perhaps 
the different groundings of the two discourses. Both share a common view of the 
power structure of human and nature. And since anthropocentrism is adequate for 
explaining the power structure of all oppressions, it is unimportant to note the 
difference between deep ecology and ecofeminism. This overlooking of the difference 
between deep ecology and ecofeminism incurs ecofeminism's objection that deep 
ecology simply fails to understand what ecofeminism really means?. 
As I argue in the following section, ecofeminism stresses particularly on the 
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inter-relatedness and inseparability of all oppressions, while deep ecology sees no 
connections between oppressions except for a common underlying cause in 
anthropocentrism. For instance, deep ecologist Zimmerman (1987, 1994) argues that 
the domination of women and domination of nature are two separate things and deep 
ecology needs not be concerned with the former. "Deep ecologists are still only 
reformists: they want to improve the humanity-nature relationship without taking the 
radical step of eliminating both man's domination of woman... and the culturally 
enforced self-denigration of woman." (Zimmerman, 1987, p. 38) To understand and 
discuss the oppression of nature, then, the issues of gender, class and race can be 
bracketed. Indeed, Zimmerman further asserts, women have been equally destructive 
to nature as men, and should not be exempted from the responsibility of being 
destructive to earth other. Women and men should bear the same responsibility. 
This blindness to the interrelationship between the oppression of women and the 
domination of nature triggers ecofeminism's objections and criticism of deep ecology. 
To ecofeminism, as long as deep ecology fails to realize the "real problems" of 
“anthropocentrism,，and the connections of human domination of nature to other 
oppressions, it cannot go beyond anthropocentrism. What ecofeminism understand to 
be the “real problem" and how this "real problem" links with other oppressions are 
thus central to ecofeminism's criticisms of deep ecology. It accounts for 
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ecofeminism's disagreement with and criticisms of deep ecology for failing to 
recognize the inter-relatedness between all oppressions. 
Ecofeminism and the critique of deep ecology's understanding of 
anthropocentrism 
To ecofeminists, deep ecology's understanding of anthropocentrism is 
fundamentally flawed and herein lies the crux of the ecofeminism- deep ecology 
debate. Val Plumwood offers a clear articulation of the ecofeminism critique in her 
recent writings (1997, 2002). According to Plumwood, to claim anthropocentrism as 
problematical only because of its views of non-humans as mere instrument is far too 
simple. Like other ecofeminists, Plumwood believes that the ‘‘real problem" of 
human- centeredness goes beyond human domination of nature and has to be 
understood in terms of the inlerrelatedness of oppressions. 
As the name ecofeminism (ecological feminism) literally denotes, ecofeminism 
is a group of ideas which tries to establish connections between feminist analysis and 
environmental issues. The word ecofeminism is first coined by Francoise D'Eaubonne 
in 1974. In general, ecofeminists all agree that ecology is in fact a feminist issue. King 
(1990) provides a good general statement on ecofeminism, 
[IJn ecofeminism, nature is the central category of analysis. An analysis of the 
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interrelated dominations of nature 一 psyche and sexuality, human oppression, and 
nonhuman nature — and the historic position of women in relation to those forms 
of domination is the starting point of ecofeminist theory. (King, 1990, p. 117) 
To ecofeminists, the understanding of the oppressions of women will help to 
understand the oppressions and hence the liberation of nature, since the “twin 
dominations of women and nature" are "intimately connected and mutually 
reinforcing" (Warren, 1999, p. 24; King, 1993, p. 70). Karen Warren's work (Warren 
& Cheney, 1996; Warren, 1987, 1996, 2000) demonstrates this connection clearly. She 
believes that there is a "logic of domination" underlying all "-isms of domination", 
which includes racism, classism, heterosexism and sexism. That is, the structure of 
justifying subordination in all dominations is identical. It is a structure of diialistic 
pairs constituted in the logic of domination. To put it simply, the oppression of men 
over women, human over nature rely largely on a hierarchical and organization of 
differences between men/ women, human/ nature. The diialistic opposition of men 
(human) as a superior group against women (nature) as an inferior group justifies 
domination and subordination. Thus, women and nature are associated in the way that 
they are both oppressed under the same logic of domination. Warren is not saying that 
androcentrism (male- centeredness) is the only root of the problems. On the contrary, 
deep ecology's identifying a single root of the cause of all oppressions is indeed 
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"patriarchal thinking”，"[t]here is no single root cause of oppression, domination, or 
exploitation; indeed, one could argue that it is typical of patriarchal thinking that one 
looks for single, unitary causal explanations for phenomena" (Warren 1999, p. 257). 
What the "logic of domination" means is that all oppressions in different historical 
and cultural contexts are interdependent. They are under the same justification 
structure, "a logic of domination assumes that superiority justifies subordination" 
(Warren, 2000, p. 47). As Warren (2000) gives a detail explanation, 
(1) At least in Western societies, whenever a group is historically 
identified with nonhuman nature and the realm of the physical, it is 
conceptualized as morally inferior to whatever group is historically 
identified with culture and the realm of the mental. 
(2) At least in Western societies, women as a group historically have 
been identified with nonhuman nature and the realm of the physical, 
while at least dominant men have been historically identified with 
culture and the realm of the mental. 
Thus, (3) At least in Western societies, women as a group are conceptualized 
as morally inferior to at least dominant men 
(4) For any X and Y, if X is conceptualized as morally inferior to Y, 
then Y is justified in subordinating (or dominating) X. 
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Thus, (5) At least in Western societies, dominant men are justified in 
subordinating (or dominating) both women and nonhuman nature 
(p.50-51). 
As illustrated, the logic of domination justifies the Up as morally superior (and as a 
dominant) than the Down. For instance, in the above argument, the characteristic of 
being identified with the realm of mental justifies men's superiority and domination 
over women and nature (as lack). Seemingly, deep ecology shares a similar view with 
ecofeminism that there is a unified dominating structure lying behind all oppressions. 
However, this is only a superficial agreement, as deep ecology sees no connections 
between these oppressions. To deep ecology, the oppressions can be solved 
independently, while to Warren and many other ecofeminists, this assumption is 
highly problematical as all-isms of domination are interdependent and can never be 
solved independently. 
In particular, many ecofeminists stress that the two oppressions of women and 
nature are inter-related and "mutually reinforcing" historically. For instance, Carolyn 
Merchant (1983, 1995) grounds her analysis of the twin oppression of women and 
nature on western historical links. She evaluates these historical links from the ancient 
Indo European societies to the 19/20"1 Century. She identifies the 16/1/'^ century 
struggle between the earth-centered woiidview and sun-centered worldview as the 
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turning point for a mechanistic worldview. When the Indo-Europeans abandoned the 
earth-centered worldview for a sun-centered one, they abandoned at the same time 
things which were regarded as non-scientific. Women and nature were regarded as 
non-scientific, and hence considered necessary to be kept under control. It was at this 
critical point that man became the master of the world, dominating and rejecting the 
non-scientific, viewing the world in mechanistic terms. Science, which devalues 
women and nature, becomes the legitimate conceptual framework. 
While Merchant highlights the oppressions of women and nature from a 
historical perspective, PI urn wood (1993, 2002) accentuates the connections of the 
oppressions of women and nature in the light of western traditional thinking. Starting 
from Plato and Aristotle, women and nature are depicted as irrational chaos and 
disorder, especially in contrast to men as rational and order. Human is defined against 
the natural as controlling the natural and pursuing a "higher type of life" (Plumwood, 
1993, p. 109). Descartes' mind/ body dualism further privileges rationality (mind) to 
enable humans to exercise power over the natural world and women, relegating nature 
(women, body) to something to be controlled. The one who can think rationally is the 
one who rules over the irrationals, to put order to disorder. The universe is, then, 
divided into two substances, mindful and non-mindful. Women and nature are seen as 
mere stuffs and instrument, non-mindful and non- agential. As such, the reason/ 
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nature dualism becomes the underlying force of all dualisms. Rationality or reason 
sets the standard of the superior side, of men over women, human over nature, mind 
over body. Men have the ability to think and be rational, hence they have to take 
control over the irrational stuffs including nature, body and women. "[Ejverything on 
the ‘superior’ side can be represented as forms of reason, and virtually everything on 
the underside can be represented as forms of nature" (Plumwood, 1993, p.44). 
Rationality justifies the superiority of the men (human). Men are rational (mind) 
against the pure matter (body) of women and nature, and everything which is 
irrational is devalued and to be kept under control. 
Based on this critique of western thoughts, Plumwood (1993) and other 
ecofeminists hold that the concept of "human" is implicitly masculinisl, as the 
characteristics of being a human are also the characteristics of being a man, such as 
rationality, transcendence, domination and control of nature. To be distinctively 
human means to be rational and rationality is the means for legitimating "humanness". 
It is, then, not the case that anthropocentricism is problematical, but, rather, the male-
centered rationalism and domination implicated in anthropocentricism (Plumwood, 
2002). Though deep ecology also recognizes the problems of mind/ body dualism as 
the underlying mechanism of all oppressions, its failure to recognize the implicit 
masculinism behind this dualism, and the interconnection of all oppressions under this 
22 
masculinist dualism makes it unacceptable to ecofeminism. As Plum wood stresses, 
underlying the term "men" is the problematical tradition of rationality that allows men 
to set themselves apart as superior by highlighting their "rationality" against the 
“animality” of nature and woman. Science optimizes this mechanism of reason and 
rationality that places "human" as the core subject and characterizes nature (and 
women) as irrational, mere stuff and mere matter. Nature is a mere "environment", the 
only function of which is to demonstrate human's creativity, rationality and 
consciousness. Thus, "human beings" are never “gender- neutral", but implicitly 
gendered masculine, making the oppressions of women and nature not two separate 
things but one (Kheel, p. 179) 
Plumwood (1993, 1997) further points out that the dualistic structure of reason/ 
nature, human/ nature, men/ women, culture/ nature rely heavily on the denial of the 
other. That is, the superiority of the upper group depends on the denial of the value of 
the lower group. She specifically lists five characteristics to spell out the problems of 
dualism: radical exclusion, incorporation, instrumentalism, homogenization and 
backgrounding. ‘ This detailed explanation of dualism is crucial to our later 
discussion in that it sets the framework for defining "masculinist". 
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1. Radical exclusion (hyperseparation) 
The formation of “men” (humans) depends largely on exclusions and denials. 
Men can acquire his identity only by denying others. Hence, he has to deny others 
continuously so as to attain a stable identity. This continuous denial of others, or 
denial dependency, leads to the hyperseparation of the masculine self. 
Hyperseparation differs from separation in that hyperseparation entails a dualistic 
exclusion and total denial of the other, while separation merely depicts self and other 
as two separate entities, without entailing any self/ other dualism and total denial. 
Within this process of radical exclusion, continuity is totally neglected, 
differences between the two entities are highly stressed. Commonalities shared by the 
two entities are also denied. "Discontinuity is obtained via an account of human 
identity and virtue which eliminates overlap with the 'animal within', or polarises this 
as not truly pari of the self or as belonging to a lower, baser ‘animal’ part of se l f 
(Plumwood, p. 71). Men are characterized as rational, intellectual and dominant while 
emphatically excluded from features associated with women and nature such as 
passivism, emotion and altruism. Furthermore, through denying continuity with 
women and nature and through emphasizing differences with them, men set 
themselves as the master, forgetting that he is at the same time paradoxically apart 
from and part of the world. “Human,，posits himself outside the interconnected web of 
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the world, alienating himself from the "natural". Men (human) define himself by 
hyperseparating from women (nature). This also explains why men/ women and 
human/ nature always appear as complementary pairs. 
2. Incorporation 
Women and nature have been defined as lack in relation to man and human. Both 
women and nature are not autonomous. Since women and nature are seen as mere 
matter and environment without any intrinsic value, women and nature are 
presupposed to be altruistic to satisfy other's needs. The dualistic structure does not 
respect or recognize women's and nature's agency and autonomy. Women and nature 
are valued only according to their capacities in fulfilling other's interests, and 
recognized only in their assimilation with man. They are simply incorporated into 
men's needs and desires. 
3. InstiTimentalism 
Instrumental ism refers to the denial of agency of women and nature. Their 
agencies are being subsumed into their "master", man (human). Their only value is to 
serve and support their "master". These denied others are not regarded as individuals, 




As an "animal" and instrument, women and nature are all the same and can not 
be differentiated under the dualism. Their differences are totally denied. At the same 
time, the dominant class "man" also has to be homogenized to confirm the superiority 
of the whole group, just as the inferior group needs to be homogenized to affirm the 
inferiority of the subordinated. In human/ nature, men/ women dualisms, 
homogenization produces two sharply differentiated and polarized groups, with man 
assuming the essential "natures" of rational, cultural and social, while woman and 
nature come to mean natural, irrational and primitive. Nature has been defined as 
“units” and "resources" instead of its diversity and complexities. 
5. Backgrounding and denial 
Nature has been set merely as a resource supporting human's economic growth 
and technological development. Similarly, women have been regarded as a mere 
support and background for men. As described by Plumwood, paradoxically both 
nature and women have been treated as "inessential", so that their resistance do not 
pose a threat to human or man. Yet, as their voices can never be completely denied, 
women and nature are regarded as a source of threat and uncertainties. 
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Noteworthily, hyperseparation and incorporation deny others differently. 
Hyperseparation (supported by instrumental ism) denies others through denying their 
relationship and continuity with others, regarding others as mere stuffs and 
instruments, while incorporation (supported by homogenization) denies others 
through denying differences, homogenizing, subsuming others into one's own self. To 
counter hyperseparation (and instrumental ism), one has to emphasize continuity and 
relatedness, while to counter incorporation (and homogenization), one has to 
emphasize differences. Hence, to escape dualism, one has to acknowledge both 
continuity and differences; otherwise dualism remains. This is especially important 
for understanding how and why ecofeminists criticize deep ecology's proposed self/ 
nature relationship (Self Realization) as being masculinist, which will be discussed 
later in chapter two. In short, the five characteristics Plumwood lists gives a clear 
account of the problems of dualism and the connections between the oppressions of 
women and nature. It clarifies how, to ecofeminists, the word “human'，is never 
neutral, but, inherently masculinist. 
From this account, it is not hard to see why ecofeminism criticizes that, "deep 
ecologists have not attempted, nor hardly acknowledged, the sophisticated sort of 
analyses of gender, or of gender and nature, or, especially, of the ways in which 
anthropocentrism is androcentric, which feminists and ecofeminists have undertaken" 
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(Slicer, 1995, p. 154). Ecofeminism does not wholly reject deep ecology's 
understanding of "anthropocentrism" in terms of the instrumentalization of 
non-humans. Rather, it criticizes this view of anthropocentrism for failing to 
recognize the deeper problems behind this instrumental view of nature, namely, the 
dualislic structure of reason/ nature and the interlinked oppressions between women 
and nature. As Ariel Salleh (1984) indicates in her essay's title, "Deeper than deep 
ecology: the eco-feminist connection", ecofeminism claims to have a more "in-depth" 
account of the problems. Deep ecology will not be "deep" enough for ecofeminists 
unless it can recognize the importance of gender (see also, Salleh, 1984, 1992, 1999; 
Slicer, 1995; Cheney, 1987; Warren, 1987, 1999; Plumwood, 1997; Kheel 1990). To 
distinguish from deep ecology's view of anthropocentrism, ecofeminism generally 
calls this “deeper” reading of "anthropocentrism" androcentrism, or in Plumwood's 
word, “the liberation model of anthropocentrism" (Plumwood, 1997, p. 335; King, 
1993; Slicer 1995; see also Warren, 1999). 
Ecofeminism's women- nature connection and its problems 
The women- nature connection is of particular importance to ecofeminism not 
only because ecofeminism sees the oppressions of the two as mutually reinforcing and 
inler-related, but also because ecofeminism believes the women- nature connection 
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may provide an "alternative" to the current problematical masculinist dualistic model. 
Yet, this “alternative,，provided by ecofeminists is also problematical. In the following 
section, I follow Plumwood's (1990) argument, where she gives a detailed analysis on 
the argument structure and possible options of ecofeminism over the issue of women-
nature connection as an alternative, to explore the importance and problems of 
ecofeminism’s women- nature connection. 
According to Plumwood (1990), the women- nature connection is so important 
that it cannot be ignored. There are several reasons why this women- nature 
connection cannot be ignored. As discussed, "human" is implicitly masculine, female 
and non-humans are backgrounded, homogenized and silent. To ignore the women-
nature connection will easily lead into the masculinist model of incorporating and 
ignoring the voices of women and nature. In order to be a "human- being", women fit 
themselves into the masculinist model, resulting in the consolidation of the 
dominating masculinist model. This act of women's participation into the cultural 
sector continues the domination of women, since it submits women under the 
domination of groups of rationality such as medical experts and science. In fact it is 
the m a s c L i l i n i s l ' s strategy to ignore the women- nature connection, maintaining the 
masculinist domination towards women and nature (Plumwood, 1990). 
Furthermore, the women- nature connection is the fundamental grounding of 
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ecofeminism, it is in fact ecofeminists' ''own house" (Plumwood, 1990, p. 215). This 
“own house" refers, first, to the fact that the oppression of women and the oppression 
of nature are inter-related and reinforcing as discussed above. If women fail to 
recognize their oppressions as associated with the oppression of nature, it is unlikely 
for them to liberate themselves (and nature) from the domination of "men". Second, 
the women- nature connection is ecofeminists' "own house" in the sense that it 
provides an "alternative" to the alienation or ‘'disconnectedness，，of the masculinist 
model (Plumwood, 1990, p. 214). Women are different from men. Women, who are 
devalued with nature, are not trained to be destructive and dominating like men. More 
importantly, to some ecofeminists, the devalued "feminine values" are necessary for 
the liberation of women, nature and even men/) Before explaining how the "feminine 
values" can be positioned in response to masculinism, it is important to look at Ariel 
Salleh's proposed ecofeminism as an example. 
Salleh (1984) emphasizes the biological difference between women and men, 
such as child-caring, motherhood and pregnancy, suggesting that women stand closer 
to nature. "Women's monthly fertility cycle, the tiring symbiosis of pregnancy, the 
wrench of childbirth and the pleasure of suckling an infant, these things already 
ground women's consciousness in the knowledge of being coterminous with Nature" 
(Salleh, 1984, p. 340). The unique experiences of women situate women differently 
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from men in that, biologically and socially, women already “flow with the system of 
nature" (Salleh, 1984, p. 340). As Salleh argues, this women- nature connection 
already embodies a clear alternative and provides 'an immediate "living" social basis' 
to a harmonious relationship between human/ nature which deep ecology is trying to 
construct in an abstract way (Salleh, p. 340; see also. King, 1993).'() 
What Salleh suggests is that the women- nature connection is important as "an 
alternative” to masculinism. As King further notes, “we can use it (women- nature 
connection) as a vantage point for creating a different kind of culture and politics 
that...create a free, ecological society" (1993, p. 74). This echoes Riane Eisler (1990, 
1996), who suggests the ancient matriarchal society as the ideal partnership model of 
the world. As Eisler proposes, the tradition of Goddess and the matriarchal society 
present an egalitarian and non-patriarchic world which we have long been looking for. 
In this egalitarian matriarchal society, nature is not regarded as an object for 
exploitation. ‘“Feminine” values such as caring, compassion, and non-violence were 
not subordinate to men and the so-called masculine values of conquest and 
domination. Rather, the life- giving powers incarnated in women's bodies were given 
the highest social value' (Eisler, 1990, p. 24). Importantly, this re-accentuation of the 
devalued feminine values and nature does not lead to the subordination of men, but to 
an egalitarian and harmonious men- women- nature relationship. Eisler calls this the 
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partnership model, in contrast to the dominating society world-view, where men 
subordinate women and nature. Rather than a substitution of matriarchal power for 
patriarchal domination, Eisler suggests, this matriarchal society or the Goddess 
tradition provides a model for the liberation of women, nature and men.‘‘ 
To assess such ecofeminist claims, it is important to ask how exactly this 
femininity create an alternative to masculinism. It is also important to ask how 
femininity is in relation to, or responds to masculinism. Plumwood (1990) provides a 
clear account of various possible the relations between femininity and masculinism:'^ 
First, the masculinist model is affirmed, while femininity is rejected. (This is the 
model which ecofeminists are criticizing.) 
Second, the masculinist model is affirmed, and femininity is also affirmed. 
Third, the masculinist model is rejected, while femininity is affirmed. This is 
known as the “feminine model" (Plumwood, 1990, p. 227). 
Fourth, both masculinism and femininity are rejected. 
The first model, which is the traditional masculinist model, is obviously 
problematical and unacceptable as I have discussed. The other three models are also 
undesirable. The second model states that masculinism may be complemented by 
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upholding the devalued femininity. That is, masculinism is not necessarily be 
challenged but rather complemented and supported by femininity. This second model 
suggests that we have to re-affirm femininity as human's traits. Besides rationality 
and order, feminine virtues such as care and love should also be treated as human 
trails. To Plumwood, this is problematic: since femininity has long been prescribed as 
a complement under the masculinist model, the reaffirmation of femininity without 
challenging the maculinist model, easily confines women to its complementary roles. 
For example, nurturance is one of the most common traits ecofeminists advocate. Yet, 
this “feminine” trait may easily reduce women to nurturing, making women 
automatically equal to nurturance. Furthermore, to glorify femininity in its 
complementary role, without revising masculinism, is confine femininity to a 
complementary position. Though feminine virtues are now valued, they remain mere 
complements to support the traditional masculinist traits. It is hence questionable how 
this complementary role of femininity can lead to the liberation of women. 
The third model, of setting femininity against masculinism, is also unacceptable. 
Feminine virtues, instead of masculinist virtues such as rationality, are now set as the 
“human ideal" for both sexes (Plumwood, 1990, p. 223). This is problematical since 
this will result in a reversal of the dualism. Rationality, which is previously set as 
“human ideal" is now devalued, resulting in a reverse hierarchal dualism of emotion/ 
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mind. Furthermore, since femininity is set opposite masculinism as altruistic, or 
denying oneself to serve others interest, it is questionable of how such femininity can 
stand alone. 
The fourth model is not practical at all, as the rejection of both masculinism and 
femininity destroys all the groundings of ecofeminism. 
If, as Plumwood makes clear, all these possible relations between femininity and 
masculinism are problematical, it is uniquely questionable how ecofeminism can 
advance an alternative based on "feminine" values. What do Eisler's proposed 
"alternative" or King's ‘‘a different kind of culture and politics" really mean? It seems 
that what Eisler suggests is the second model. In light of Plumwood's analysis, it is 
unclear how the partnership model can create a world that "women and men lived in 
harmony with one another and nature", without reducing women to mere 
complementary roles (Eisler, 1990, p. 25). While it is undeniable that the matriarchal 
society provides a possible revision of the masculinist model, it is unclear and 
unknown how exactly this "alternative" responds to the current masculinist model. 
Moreover, regardless of these unresolved questions of how to posit femininity in 
relation to masculinism, the notion of femininity on which the "alternative" is 
grounded is in fact even more problematical. 
To revaluate femininity and make it the ground of an alternative requires a stable 
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and clear notion of femininity. Yet, it is unclear what femininity genuinely is 
(Plumwood, 1990). Femininity is never clearly explained in ecofeminist literature. To 
the extent it is clarified, femininity is associated with virtues like nurturance, 
motherhood, childcare and love. Yet, it remains unclear what grounds these feminine 
virtues or of what exactly these feminine virtues refer to. As Plumwood quotes 
Christiane Makward, femininity is, in fact, something "not to be defined" (1990, p. 
223). 
While, many ecofeminists thus leave femininity undefined, some ecofeminists 
resort to biological determinism to find a possible grounding for femininity. As such, 
femininity can be concretely defined by what females biologically “develop and 
display" (Plumwood, 1990, p. 226). This is apparent in Salleh, for example, who 
continues to rely on biological determinism while many other feminists shy away 
from essentialism. Unsurprisingly, it is such biological determinism that ecofeminism 
is always being criticized for (Plumwood, 1990; Zimmerman, 1984; Sandilands, 1999; 
Biehl, J. 1991; Cuomo, 1998). 
Biological determinism aside, it is doubtful whether a reference to femininity can 
avoid essenlializing and universalizing "women" or "women experience". Given that 
the experience developed in women varies from different nations and circumstances, 
what really constitutes femininity is highly contention.'^ Thus, though the women-
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nature connection is considered central to ecofeminism, it is also difficult, if not 
impossible, to establish it on defensible grounds and make it the foundation of an 
alternative to the masculinist model of women- nature relationship. Herein lies a 
major impasse for ecofeminism. 
This impasse is clearly discernible in Plumwood's work. Though Plumwood 
(1990) spells out the problems of identifying femininity and positing femininity as an 
alternative to the masculinist model, she seems unable to overcome the problems to 
establish a viable ground for ecofeminism's claims. Hence at the end of her essay, 
Plumwood writes, “a different concept of closeness to nature from the traditional one 
has to be invoked" (Plumwood, 1990, p. 232). What this thesis offers is precisely such 
a different account of self/ nature relationship to ecofeminism. As I argue in chapter 
three, the specific self/ nature relationship found in Wang Wei's object- oriented 
poems brings new light to the issues in both deep ecology and ecofeminism. However, 
before discussing the self/ nature relationship found in Wang's object- oriented poems, 
we have to analyze the specific self/ nature relationship in deep ecology and 
ecofeminism in the next chapter. And we will see that since Plumwood also cannot 
escape these unsolved problems of ecofeminism's grounding of women- nature 
(Evans, 1993), she drops the usual grounding of women- nature in her proposed self/ 
nature relationship, leaving this account of self without ground. 
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Chapter two Self/ nature relationships: Self Realization and the relational self 
In the previous chapter, we have gone through the main ideas of deep ecology 
and ecofeminism, examining how the two ideologies differ in reading the term 
"anthropocentrism". To recapitulate, ecofeminism deems deep ecology's reading of 
the term anthropocentrism as viewing non-humans as mere instruments too “shallow”. 
To ecofeminism, deep ecology fails to recognize the dualistic structure behind this 
instrumental ism, and the relations between all oppressions. Following from this 
criticism, ecofeminism also finds deep ecology's proposed self/ nature relationship 
based on the principle of Self Realization masculinist, as the chapter will show. 
While the previous chapter focuses on the problems and causes of environmental 
discussion, this chapter focuses on the "solution" to "anthropocentrism". Deep 
ecology and ecofeminism have proposed two different accounts of self/ nature 
relationship to re- connect human (self) to nature, namely, Self Realization proposed 
by deep ecology and relational self proposed by ecofeminism. This chapter will look 
into the details of these two self/ nature relationships, and see how and why Self 
Realization is being criticized by ecofeminism as masculinist. At the end of this 
chapter, we will also discuss how the unsolved problems of the women- nature 
grounding discussed at the end of the previous chapter remain problematical in 
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ecofeminism's relational self. 
Deep ecology's resolution to the problem of anthropocentrism 
After identifying anthropocentrism as a problem, deep ecology suggests a 
non-anthropocentric self/ nature relationship in response. This non- anthropocentric 
way of thinking includes two concepts, the relational total field and bioegalitarianism, 
which set human in relation to nature and acknowledge the intrinsic value of nature. 
Based on these two concepts. Self Realization is the proposed means to achieve a 
non- anthropocentric human- nature relationship. 
Self Realization is a new communicative model between human and nature. It is 
“a process of self-examination in which people come to understand themselves as part 
of a greater whole". (DesJardins, 1993, p.225) According to Naess (1989, 1993), in 
the western process of the maturity of self, human undergoes development from ego, 
to social ego, and finally to metaphysical self. Nature is excluded in the whole process. 
What Naess wants to do is to bring nature back in, overcome alienation, and go 
beyond this western isolated self. To achieve this aim, Naess proposes Self 
Realization. Self Realization can be best explained by an example put forward by 
Naess. Naess (1995) describes how he saw a dying flea and found the death struggle 
of the flea under microscope extremely expressive. He empathized with the flea. He 
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fell sorrow for it and felt its pain. What is working behind his compassions and 
empathy is the process of identification. Through identifying with the flea, Naess felt 
the pain and sorrow of the flea. Identification links Naess and the flea together. Naess 
saw himself in the flea. The flea becomes a part of himself, so he can feel its pain and 
struggle. This is Self Realization for Naess. Through identifying with non-humans, 
humans come to realize their intrinsic relations to the identified entities, and the fact 
that humans and non-humans are related within the same whole field (that is, the 
relational total field). When we come to realize our relations with more and more 
non-humans, we can go beyond the western narrow and isolated self. It is because we 
will no longer see ourselves as isolated, but realize the fact that we are a part of the 
greater whole. This is the reason why Naess and many deep ecologists stress strongly 
a broader sense of identification. Self Realization does not aim at a limited human self, 
but the greater whole. Hence, Naess uses Self (with a capital S) to signify the greater 
whole, and self (with a small s) to signify the limited human self. 
According to deep ecology, through identification one can come to realize the 
intrinsic value of the non-humans. When Naess identifies with the flea, the flea is 
neither an instrument nor a mere matter to him, but a living being with its own 
intrinsic value. The dying ilea has the same equal right to live as humans. When we 
identify with non-humans, we realize that they, too, are living beings with intrinsic 
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values. To realize non- humans as separate beings, and at the same time recognize our 
relations with them, humans need to position themselves as a part of the greater whole. 
“By identifying with greater wholes, we partake in the creation and maintenance of 
this whole" (Naess, 1989, p. 173). The process of identification is to see through the 
interconnectedness between human and non-humans, to see ourselves in the 
non-humans. When we see the greater whole as a part of us, we will protect and drive 
for non-humans' interest as if we protect our own interests. "We seek what is best for 
ourselves, but through the extension of the self, our ‘own’ best is also that of others" 
(Naess, 1989, p. 175). The interest of the greater whole now becomes our own interest. 
And, if we harm others, we harm ourselves. Identification is not limited to living 
beings. 
Fox (1995) further elaborates Naess's concept of Self-Realization into 
transpersonal ecology. As Fox puts it, there are three different bases of identification, 
"personally based identification", "ontologically based identification", and 
"cosmologically based identification" (p. 136, 137). Personally based identification 
refers to the common experiences brought by personal involvement with other entities. 
We tend to identify with entities which we always contact with, like family and pets. 
The identification is not limited to living entities but even to non-living entities, for 
instance the football club. When we identify with these entities, we see them as a part 
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of us. In contrast, ontological and cosmological identification are transpersonal. 
Ontological based identification is the "realization of the fact that things are" (Fox, 
1995, p. 137). Ontological based identification is to recognize, appreciate and respect 
the existence of the non-human entities. This identification not only respects and 
admits the intrinsic value of the non humans, but also respects non-humans' existence. 
To put it simply, ontological based identification is to realize and respect that 
non-humans exist within the same total field with humans. Cosmological based 
identification is to realize that "we and all other entities are aspects of a single 
unfolding reality" (Fox, p. 139). That is, to realize that we and all other entities are a 
whole unity. Fox elaborates with an example of science. Science has been wrongly 
taken anthropocentrically, as a means for human's manipulation, prediction and 
control of nature. From a cosmological perspective, science provides an account of 
the complexities, diversity and interconnectedness of the greater whole. Science helps 
us to realize that humans and non-humans are in the same greater whole. To Fox, 
ontological and cosmological based identification are of higher significance than 
personally based identification. It is because the personally based identification is 
limited to our personal contacts, which may trigger possessiveness, war and 
destruction. In contrast, through identifying with more and more entities, destruction 
brought by personal emotions can be avoided. 
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Ecofeminism's criticisms of Self Realization as a masculine sense of self 
Self Realization is an attempt to affirm both relatedness and the intrinsic value of 
nature. Relatedness (or in ecofeminism's word, continuity) and the intrinsic value of 
nature are both important undeniably. Yet, what deep ecology fails to recognize as 
equally important is the notion of difference. Failing to address difference between 
human and nature, Self Realization becomes an attempt of homogenization and 
incorporation (Plumwood, 1991, 1993,2002). 
The problems of incorporation and homogenization are more explicit in Fox's 
transpersonal account of deep ecology. As Fox puts it, "there is no firm ontological 
divide in the field of existence... the world simply is not divided up into independently 
existing subjects and objects, nor is there any bifurcation in reality between the human 
and non-human realms" (2003, p. 255). The transpersonal account of deep ecology 
rejects boundaries and refuses to admit the independence of other entities, aiming at a 
total subsumption of all beings, where nothing exist on their own, but inter-connected 
and are inter-related. To Plumwood, the obliteration of the human/ nature boundaries 
in Fox's account of Self Realization neglects the difference between nature and 
human. As argued in chapter one, to escape from dualism, both continuity and 
difference have to be acknowledged. The problem of Self Realization lies in deep 
ecology's failure to recognize both continuity and difference, resulting in 
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homogenization and incorporation. In failing to differentiate human from a Coca Cola 
bottle, for instance, deep ecology homogenizes human and nature. It focuses too 
overwhelmingly on the alienation between human and non-humans and fails to 
acknowledge and respect non-humans as an "other" (Plumwood 1993, 2002). On this 
basis, ecofeminism criticizes deep ecology as masculinist. 
This problem of incorporation of Self Realization can be attributed to deep 
ecology's insensitivity to the issue of “speaking for the other" (Plumwood, 1997, p. 
349). Self Realization simply assumes that the best of human interests are also 
non-humans' best interests. This ignores the fact that human is the only moral agent, 
non-humans cannot speak. Deep ecology's Self Realization is in fact an attempt to 
speak for the non-humans, representing non-humans to drive for their best interests. 
Yet, Self Realization's “speaking for the other" is highly problematical since the 
non-humans are homogenized and incorporated, being assimilated to speak. 
Importantly, we should note the difference between being unable to speak and being 
assimilated to speak. Being unable to speak is not necessarily problematical. Though 
non-humans are unable to speak, non-humans as subjects and distinct entities in 
relation to human may still be respected. (This will be further illustrated by 
ecofeminism's relational self.) In contrast, being assimilated to speak is problematical 
as non-humans as an "other" is not acknowledged and respected, but merely 
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subsumed. To represent others by incorporating them into one's speaking self results 
in an aggrandizement of self. Self Realization's encompassing all other's interests 
thus becomes an excuse to widen self's interests (Plumwood, 1991, 1993, 1997)�4 
Then, how should we position human when "speaking for the others", especially 
with reference to Self Realization? To recall, Self Realization aims at, first, 
re-asserting the intrinsic value of nature, and second, driving for nature's best interests. 
Yet, human perspectives, including values and moral judgments, are inescapable and 
undeniable. Only human is the moral agent (Curtin, 1995; Cuomo 1998). It is after all 
human who claims that nature has intrinsic values. It is human who claims and 
defines the standard of the “best interests" of nature. Human position and human 
judgment of interests cannot be completely eliminated from this process of 
identification. A total detachment of human concerns and interests are simply 
impossible. However, there is a real difference between incorporating others to speak 
and speaking for others while at the same time critically reviewing the speaker's 
standpoint. As Plumwood (1997, 2002) proposes, self criticism or consciousness of 
the inevitable human perspective makes a major difference. Though a human 
perspective is inevitable, it does not necessarily lead to incorporation and 
homogenization. By being conscious of the act of "speaking for the others" and 
recognizing the others as distinct entities, incorporation and homogenization may be 
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avoided even if the inevitable human perspective remains. This can explain why 
difference is of such importance in ecofeminism's criticism of Self Realization. Self 
Realization is criticized not for "speaking for the others", but for assimilating others 
to speak, and hence maintaining masculinist domination. 
A "feminine" sense of self and its problems 
In critiquing deep ecology's formulation of Self Realization, ecofeminists gesture 
toward the advancement of a different self/ nature model that is implicitly based on a 
"feminine" sense of self, or the relational self. Yet, while much has been written on 
the relational self, there is little elaboration or clarification of how such a self offers a 
different understanding of the self-nature relation or how it relates to the 
women-nature connection. 
To understand a "feminine" sense of self, we have to understand its implicit 
opposite, the masculine sense of self. In fact, men establish their sense of self through 
denying and mastering nature. On the contrary, female's concept of self is devalued 
with nature (Kheel, 1990). Kheel bases her argument on Dorothy Dinnerstein's 
explanation ol� the masculine self. According to Dinnerstein, boys cannot distinguish 
themselves from their mothers during infancy and see themselves as part of their 
mothers. Mother is the center of an infant's world. An infant contacts the world 
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through its mother. As long as the infant fails to articulate the boundaries as an 
individual, mother is part of nature, an integral part of the surroundings. Mother's 
body is the source of food, she is also a mini cosmos and the source of life. A boy fails 
to acquire “I-ness,, until his father appears as a complete and separate individual. To 
acquire the “1-ness,，，to be cultural and to be a human being, the boy has to devalue 
and objectify both women and nature. In this process, women and nature are 
homogenized, incorporated and instrumentalized, resulting in a subject- object 
relationship. The masculine sense of self in Kheel's account refers to such a self 
realized through this denial and exclusion. 
Against this masculinist sense of self, Plumwood proposes a 
"self-in-relationship", or the relational self to re-accentuate continuity and difference 
(1993, p. 154). The relational self consists of two different parts; one part mainly 
affirms continuity to counter hyperseparation, while the other affirms difference to 
counter incorporation. 
For the first part in affirming continuity, relatedness and interdependence is 
addressed. In the masculinist model, male is positioned at the center while female is 
supposed to forgo her own interests to fulfill male interests. Needs and interests of the 
subordinates are totally neglected. In contrast, the relational self proposed by 
Plumwood is a "non-instrumental mode" (Plumwood, 1993, p. 155; 1991). In this 
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relational self, needs and interests of humans and non- humans are not separated but 
interdependent. Both interests are involved. For instance, a mother hoping for a 
child's recovery does so for the child's sake as well as for her own sake, since the 
child's recovery will bring happiness to the mother. Here, the interests of the mother 
are not isolated, but are rather dependent on and related to that of others, who, in this 
case, is the child. As such, neither the mother nor the child has to forgo their own 
interests to fulfill the others as the instrumental mode of self requires. The needs and 
interests of self and others are inter-related and simultaneously taken into account. 
In highlighting the interdependence and inter-relatedness of interests, the non-
inslrumental mode of self counters the masculinist model. Plumwood suggests 
bringing this non-instrumental mode to the self/ nature relation by re-accentuating the 
values of ‘‘dependency and relatedness [which] have been strongly denied in the 
instrumental model" (1993, p. 154). The values of dependency and relatedness 
counter the dualistic model of self/ nature relation by emphasizing continuity between 
the two. Neither the self nor non-humans are subordinated. The non-humans are not 
seen as commodities which can be abandoned or utilized anytime for human's own 
sake. As the interests and needs of humans and non-humans are interdependent, they 
simultaneously take care for their own sakes. Thus, hyperseparation is overcome. 
Yet, even if hyperseparation can, in principle, be overcome, it is unclear from the 
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ecofeminist account how we can reach this continuity. It is also unclear by what 
means we can take both interests into account without privileging either. It is even 
more unclear how this non-instrumental model can actually work in the self/ nature 
relationship. The non- instrumental model in Plumwood outlined contains mere 
principles about taking the interests of both self and others into account. She is vague 
about how the dependency and relatedness affirmed in the non-instrumental mode are 
applicable to the self/ nature relationship. 
The mother- child example given by Plumwood is even more confusing, yet also 
revealing. If Plumwood had highlighted the mother- child relationship as an ideal 
model for human/ nature relationship, then it would have been clear that her 
conception of the non-instrumental mode of self is grounded on this relationship. 
Instead, throughout her arguments, the mother- child relation is cited as a mere 
example illustrating the relational self. In citing the mother- child relation only as an 
example, Plumwood apparently does not intend to establish a direct relationship 
between motherhood and the non- instrumental mode of self. She also makes no 
attempt to establish a clear and concrete women- nature connection, as many 
ecofeminists do. What she clearly pinpoints in her arguments is the twin oppressions 
of women and nature, but she does not specify a women- nature connection. 
Interestingly, this does not mean she thinks the issue of women- nature connection 
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unimportant either. On the contrary, as discussed in chapter two, to Plumwood, the 
“woman/ nature connection can't just be set aside" (1990, p. 214). That Plumwood 
says little about the connection of women- nature while believing this connection to 
be really important suggests a conundrum. Apparently, though Plumwood recognizes 
the importance of the women- nature connection, she also recognizes fundamental 
problems in establishing this connection. As I have described, the women- nature 
connection is highly problematical. It is unclear how to define "femininity" and how a 
revaluation of this "femininity" can liberate all women, men and nature. It is precisely 
because Plumwood recognizes these problems that she refrains from grounding the 
relational self on a women- nature connection base, leaving the relational self without 
any grounds. It is also because of this reason that she never names the relational self 
as “feminine”. 
This vagueness continues in the second part of Plumwood's relational self. This 
part deals with the necessity of recognizing difference to counter the problems of 
incorporation and homogenization. What the relational self suggests is to affirm 
difference through interactions. Through interactions, including resistance from others, 
the others as different and distinct subjects are recognized. For instance, a child may 
want the mother to stay with him while the mother disappoints her and leaves to work. 
Through this interaction, the child comes to realize the mother as a separate and 
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different subject, who makes decision as the child does. The mother is not an object 
like a toy which the child can manipulate as he or she wants, but another “center of 
subjectivity", who is different from and in relation to himself or herself (Plumwood, 
1993, p. 159). Interaction is going two-sidedly. Not only is the child influenced by the 
mother's will, but the mother is also influenced by the child's act and will. The child 
is no longer the mother's “object” or ‘‘possession，,. The child may act and grow 
differently from the mother's desire and expectation. As such, relations are not 
defined by excluding and denying the others, but through mutual interactions. The 
others as distinct subjects are recognized. Relations are established between two 
subjects, instead of subject- object. In this way, continuity and difference are both 
acknowledged. 
This example describes the interaction between two subjects, between two 
human beings. What Plumwood proposes in the relational self is to bring this 
interaction between two subjects into the human/ nature relationship. As she notes, the 
subject- subject interaction is not limited to relation between humans, it is also 
possible between humans and non-humans. For example, it is not surprising to find 
interactions and communication between human and young animals (Plumwood, 
1993). Nor is it difficult to find that the forest will respond immediately when human 
beings plant something new. However, Plumwood does not explain in details how 
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exactly the interactions between humans and non-humans help human to recognize 
and respect non-humans as subjects. It is also unclear how humans and non-humans 
can really interact. Nevertheless, the point to be highlighted here is the respect and 
recognition of non-humans as subjects and as distinct entities. To Plumwood, given 
the inevitable human perspective and the fact that non-humans are non-speaking 
entities, it is imperative that non-humans are recognized and respected as subjects. 
Only through such interaction can we avoid the problems of subsumption and 
incorporation (Plumwood, 1993, 2002). 
Interestingly, Self Realization can also be a kind of relational self. As Plumwood 
notes, Naess has also acknowledged the importance of empathy and care in 
Self-Realization. Indeed, Self Realization aims at taking care of non-humans' interests 
and establishing continuity between humans and non-humans. Such care and empathy 
may also imply interactions between humans and non-humans. Yet, the unnecessary 
holism and subsumption of others in Self Realization shortchange the relation. Once 
Self Realization acknowledges the importance of recognizing difference, it can 
become a version of the relational self (Plumwood, 1993). In other words, the two 
self/ nature relationship models are not completely incompatible (Warren, 1999). 
In sum, as Plumwood (1993) states clearly, "[s]uch a non-instrumental 
conception of relationship to the other, although not yet a full account of ecological 
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selfhood, is an important ingredient in such an account" (Plumwood, 1993, p.156). 
Yet, many details of the relational self remain unclear and need further clarification. 
In particular, it is unclear by what means this relational self can be implemented. 
Though ecofeminism's "women- nature connection" may provide a strong basis for 
the relational self, insofar as this women- nature connection is itself on shaky grounds, 
linking the relational self to the women- nature connection seems far from helpful. 
Hence, unless the problems of women- nature connection described in chapter one are 
solved, the relational self remains only “an important ingredient" of a self/ nature 
alternative. 
What I want to suggest in this thesis is that the self in Wang Wei's object-
oriented landscape poetry brings in a new perspective that helps to address this 
problem of the relational self. In the following chapter, we will examine the terms of 
the self/ nature relations in Wang's poetry, and discuss how they contribute to a 
plausible grounding of the relational self. 
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Chapter three the self/ nature relation in Wang's object- oriented poems 
In the previous chapter, we note that, to ecofeminism, Self Realization is still 
masculinist as it fails to acknowledge the importance of difference even though this 
overlooking of difference results in homogenization and incorporation of non-humans. 
Self Realization simply fails to respect non-humans as "an other", as separate entities. 
In contrast, the relational self proposed by ecofeminism seeks to affirm both 
continuity and difference. Yet, though it seems that the relational self succeeds in 
affirming both, it is unclear by what means we can arrive at this relational self. As 
Plumwood recognizes the problems in grounding a women- nature connection, she 
refrains from establishing an explicit connection between the relational self and the 
women- nature connection, leaving the relational self without grounds. To suggest a 
way out of this impasse, this chapter analyzes specific self/ nature relationships found 
in Wang Wei's s object- oriented landscape poetry. As I will show, the self/ nature 
relationship found in Wang Wei's object- oriented poems can help us to address the 
respective problems of Self Realization and the relational self. 
Landscape poetry is a representation of the human/ nature relationship in a 
literary form. Il represents the experience and interaction between human and nature. 
Chinese landscape poetry, in particular, is famous for representing a coherent human/ 
53 
nature relationship. For this reason, analyzing the relation between humans and 
non-humans depicted in Chinese landscape poems may help to bring new insights to 
environmental debates in the west. It is no coincidence that W. H. Yip, a leading 
figure in decoding Chinese landscape poetry, analyzes and discusses environmental 
issues in his latest book ([叶]2002). 
Yip's earlier writings ([葉]1980, 1991) give an insightful analysis of the relation 
between the poet and the represented ‘‘objects" (non-humans) in Chinese poetry. He 
suggests that there are two important ways in which Chinese poetry portrays the 
relationship between the poet and the objects. The first way is to project the poet's 
intellectual thinking on the non-humans, transforming the non-humans into concepts. 
The second way in portraying the poet/ object relationship is to return freedoms to the 
objects. That is, the poet “has stepped aside" from the dominant position and the 
objects appear in an "unhindered" way (Yip, 1997, p. 98; p. 99). This analysis offers 
an illuminating framework for discussing the self/ nature relation in Wang Wei's 
landscape poems. Following Yip's accounts, we are able to see how the poet, or the 
self in the poems, relates to the non-humans in Wang's landscape poems. Most 
pertinent to our discussion at hand is the self/ nature relation in Wang's object-
oriented landscape poems. In these poems, the self relates to nature in a way that 
escapes the problems of masculinism ecofeminists criticized in Self Realization, 
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paralleling ecofeminism's relational self, yet without assuming a problematic women-
nature connection. The poems thus suggest a third alternative of self- nature relation 
thai addresses the problem of both deep ecology's Self Realization and ecofeminism's 
relational self. 
In the long history of Chinese landscape poems, Wang Wei's landscape poetry 
has unsurpassed significant. His poems "characterize[d] much of the poetry of high 
tang", which was unquestionably the heyday of landscape poetry (Yu, 1987, p. 186; 
Owen, 1981). His usage of the parallel couplet, the balance of form, the style of 
simplicity, and the hidden subject of the poet in presenting the objects, all surpass his 
predecessors in Early Tang, and were imitated by poets in the later centuries. As 
Owen (1981) comments, "Wang Wei has a strong claim to having been considered the 
greatest poet of the day" (p. 36). While Wang Wei's contribution to the development 
of the Chinese landscape poetry in general is undeniable, what is most significant for 
this thesis is the specific self/ nature relationship found in Wang Wei's object- oriented 
landscape poetry. Wang Wei, who was a devoted Buddhist, demonstrated a special 
inclination to Buddhism in his poetry, which is clearly discernible in the unique self/ 
nature relationship in his landscape poetry. It is no coincidence that Wang Wei has 
been called ‘‘Shi Fo"(詩佛，the Poet Buddha), for his blending of Buddhism into his 
object- oriented landscape poetry is distinctive. Buddhist terminologies like Sunyata 
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(emptiness) and meditation suffuse in these poems, but the poems are by no means 
religious poems, as they do not include any doctrines. Rather, these are landscape 
poems integrated with Wang Wei's understanding of Buddhism, especially the concept 
of Sunyata (Jang [張],2001; Zhang [章],1997; Xiao [蕭],1997; Jiang [姜],1992; 
C h i o L i [丘H, 1992). It is this Buddhist element that particularly characterizes Wang 
Wei's poetry as unique and special. And it is this interesting relationship with 
Buddhism that demonstrates a valuable and unique self/ nature relationship that can 
contribute to resolving the respective problems of deep ecology and ecofeminism. 
Specifically, poems written in Wang Wei's later years of life when he was 
actively practicing Buddhism, such as the Wang River Collection (輞川集）， 
demonstrate his highest achievement in Chinese landscape poetry. The chosen poems 
in the thesis are all from this period. Though only a small part of Wang's entire oeuvre, 
they epitomize his special achievement in Chinese landscape poetry, and illustrate its 
well specific conception of the self/ nature relationship. Though the poems were 
composed in a different context than that of the debate between deep ecology and 
ecofeminism, the inter-connected and multi- causal human (self)/ nature relationships 
depicted therein provide an interesting and insightful account of an interrelated and 
noil- masculinist self/ nature relation that brings new light to the problems of deep 
ecology and ecofeminism. 
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Ambiguities 
Yip's [葉](1980, 1991) reading of Chinese poems outlines a basic structure of 
self/ nature relation which provides a useful starting point for our discussion.'^ Yip 
[葉]proposes two ways in which Chinese poetry portrays the relationship between the 
poet and the objects — the poet-centric (the original Chinese as 由我觀物）and 
object-centric (the original Chinese as 以物觀'物）（1980，p. 246; see also [王]Wang , 
G.Z.,1986). Poet-centric refers to the exertion of personal perspectives upon the 
non-humans. The poet gives a clear and explicit indication of the meaning of the 
objects. Readers are led to follow the poet's intention and explanation. Non-humans 
are perceived and delineated through ideas and intellectual knowledge and are being 
transformed into concepts. That is, the self (the poet) puts his or her own explanation 
and meanings upon the non-humans."^ The meanings of non-humans are understood 
according to the poet's indication. In contrast, object- oriented refers to the refraining 
of the poet from playing an active role in the poems. That is to say, the poet minimizes 
his or her own influence upon non-humans. Instead of standing as a master to the 
non-humans, the poet minimizes his or her presence and submerges into the scene of 
non-humans. Non-humans exist as if free from human's intervention, or, as Yii quotes 
Yip, viewing "things as things view themselves" (1987, p. 199). 
Because of a clear and overt indication in the poem, the poet- centric 
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representation tends to suggest a clear and linear causal relation, and strike a critical, 
analytical, and logical tone. In comparison, the object- oriented representation tends to 
free non-humans from human intellectual knowledge, trying to avoid "intervention" 
and be passive. This passivity of the poet always leads to ambiguities and 
uncertainties in the poem which make room for non-humans to present themselves. 
The following three poems by Wang Wei illustrate such passivity. 
“Deer Enclosure”（鹿柴 
空丨丄丨不兒人“ Empty mountain: no human is seen. 
但聞人語聲“ But voices of humans are heard. 
返景入、深林� Sun's reflection reaches into the woods 
復照青笞上 ° And shines upon the green moss. 
"Bamboo Lodge"(竹里館 
獨坐幽篁裏 � Sitting alone among dark bamboos, 
'揮琴t复長“肅 ° Playing the zither and whistle loud again. 
深林人不知 � Grove so deep, human do not know. 
明月來相照 � The bright moon comes to shine. 
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"Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance"(過香積寺广） 
不知香不實寺：� Not knowing the Temple of Gathered Fragrance, 
數里人雲峰 ° Miles and miles into cloud-peaks. 
古木JM人ffi “ Ancient trees, paths without people; 
深丨丨-lf"J處鐘 ° Deep in the mountains, where is the bell? 
泉‘聲II闲危石 ° Noise from the spring swallows up lofty rocks; 
曰色冷 松 � The color of the sun chills green pines. 
薄暮空潭曲 ° Toward dusk by the curve of an empty pond, 
安禪制毒龍� Peaceful meditation controls poison dragons. 
These are poems exemplifying the object- oriented representation. The three poems 
are full of ambiguities and uncertainties. The ambiguities and uncertainties arise from 
the poet's refraining from claiming a dominating center position to the non-humans. 
Many different ways of reading the non-humans are preserved"^ (Yip, 1997b). Note 
the ambiguities in these three poems. For instance, in the first line of the poem “Deer 
Enclosure", "no human is seen" entails the absence of human. The word "empty" 
further denotes the unpopulatedness of the mountain. Yet, in the second line of the 
poem, the echo of human indicates the presence of human. The presence of human, 
then, becomes paradoxical (Wang,[王]C. S., 1999). We do not know if there are 
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really any humans in the empty mountain, since the human voices may not denote the 
actual presence of human, but, rather, refer to the poet's memory and imagination (Yu, 
1987). Likewise, in the third line of "Bamboo Lodge", the reference for the phrase 
“no one knows” is unknown. Both the subject and object of the phrase “no one 
knows" are unclear. It is unclear who/ what "do not know" what. The object may refer 
to the grove. Or it may be the presence of human that is not known (Yu, 1980, 1987). 
It is also unclear who “human，，in the line refers to. It may refer to the poet, or others 
we do not know. Similarly, in the fourth line, it is unknown what/ who the moon is 
shining on. The moon may shine on the poet, or other non-humans present in the 
grove. It is non-specific and not clarified. 
The poem “Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance" is another very good 
example. It is a poem of ignorance. The whole poem depicts a journey leading to the 
Temple of Gathered Fragrance. It is a journey full of unknown, ignorance and 
unexpectedness (Yu, 1980; Wang,[王]C. S., 1999; Tau,[陶]1991). The first line of 
the poem is highly ambiguous. It is uncertain of what Wang does not know. It may 
mean that the poet does not know the location of the temple, or the poet does not 
know the Temple of Gathered Fragrance. The second and third lines are also 
ambiguous. The phase entering "into cloud-peaks" may refer to the road to the temple, 
or the location of the temple. The third line can be interpreted as either paths without 
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people, or as "no path for people" (Yii, 1980, p. 127). The failure to attribute the 
location of the bell ring further accentuates the uncertainties of the poem. The 
description of the later part of the poem, including the lofty rocks, spring, green pines 
and pond, are all displaced. We cannot attribute the location of these entities. No 
indication is provided to understand these entities in relation and connection with the 
temple. The one who is practicing the meditation cannot be confirmed. It may refer to 
the monk, or to the poet himself (Yu, 1980). The poet does not exert an overt 
indication and explanation to the poems, hence resulting in ambiguities and 
uncertainties. These ambiguities and uncertainties are important for freeing 
non-humans from the poet's intellectual intervention. 
As Yu notes, the status of “do not know" may refer to the fact that Wang Wei 
"does not possess a rational knowledge of its significance but rather an intuitive, 
nondifferentiating awareness" (1980, p. 127). The poet does not assume the 
dominating position to interpret nature. Human (the poet) is not omnipresent. Human 
also ‘‘does not know". The ‘‘does not know" in the poems suggest that human's 
intellectual knowledge is not imposed on non-humans, that these poems are not the 
result of rational thinking and analysis, but an intuitive recognition and appreciation 
of nature (Yu, 1980, 1987; Fu[傳]’ 1999; Yip [葉]，1980; 1972). Wang never intends 
to analyze or to preach in the landscape poetry. This is why an overt indication is 
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utterly missing in the poems. The poet does not intend to impose rational and 
intellectual knowledge upon non-humans either. The unknown and uncertainties in 
“Bamboo Lodge", “Deer Enclosure" and "Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance" 
can be attributed to the same reason. The vagueness in these poems represents Wang's 
consciousness o i� the limitations of rational cognition (Yu, 1980). As Yii comments 
(1980), the ignorance in the poem “Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance" is 
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extremely important. It is precisely because of this ignorance that every twist of the ‘ 
I 
I 
journey, such as the sudden appearance of the temple and the bell ring, becomes 
unexpected and surprising. Wang frees himself from any mental calculation of the 
road. He lets himself lead by nature, and "proceeds without intentions" (Yu, 1980, 
p.50). This ignorance is further illuminated and initiated by the phrase "do not know" 
in the first line. Ambiguities and uncertainties are of such importance that they 
prevent the poet from being active and assuming the dominating center. It is under 
this understanding that, as Yu puts it, the non-humans emerge "without being 
contaminated by intellectuality" (1987, p, 199). It is under these understanding that 
the poems are “pure experience" (Yip, 1972, p. ix), that non-humans are being 
represented in their "purest form" (Yip, 1997b, p. 13. see also Yip[葉]’ 1991; Wang, 
G.Z. [Jii], 1986; Yu, 1987; Barnstone 1991). Non-humans are being free from human 
interference. Non-humans are not being distorted by human intellectual. 
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Non-humans in Wang's object- oriented poems and the ineliminable human 
perspective 
As discussed in the previous chapter, human's influence and perspective cannot 
be completely eliminated from the identification of nature. Nature is a human 
construction. Yet, there is a difference between the non-humans found in Wang's 
object- oriented poems and the "non-humans" we discussed in the last chapter. It is 
undeniable that nature is a human concept and nature in Wang's poems is also not an 
"objective existence" (Wang, Z.Q.[王],2003). As Liu puts it precisely, ‘‘[p]oetry is an 
embodiment of the poet's contemplation of the world and of his own mind" (1966, p. 
49). It is undeniable that “Deer Enclosure" and "Bamboo Lodge", being poems of the 
Wang River Collection 川集)，are part of the records of Wang's retreat life in 
Wang River valley. Likewise, ‘‘Visiting Temple of Gathered Fragrance" is a record of 
the journey to the temple. They are all records of the poet's experience with nature. 
Nonetheless, human perspective in Wang's object- oriented poems is largely 
minimized. Non-humans in Wang's object- oriented poems are not subsumed into 
rational and intellectual knowledge. Freedoms are returned to non-humans. There is 
no fixed or logical interpretation for the non-humans in the poems described above, in 
contrast to the poet- centric representation, which encodes non-humans into 
preconceived orders and human perspectives. 
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Here, a comparison of human- nature relation in the poet- centric poems with 
thai in Self Realization is instructive. Both impose meanings and personal 
perspectives onto non- humans, resulting in incorporation and homogenization. This 
is precisely why ecofeminism criticizes Self Realization for aggrandizing the self in 
subsuming the others. Accordingly, once deep ecology recognizes the powerful and 
unavoidable human perspective imposed on non-humans, it may reformulate the 
notion of Self Realization to address ecofeminism's criticism. This is arguably what 
Wang's object- oriented landscape poems have achieved over the poet- centric. As Yu, 
following Yip, states: 
[t|he writer gives ‘paramount importance to the acting-out of visual objects and 
events, letting them explain themselves by their coexisting, coextensive 
emergence from nature, letting the spatial tensions reflect conditions and 
situations rather than coercing these objects and events into some preconceived 
artificial orders by sheer human interpretive elaboration. (Yu, 1980, p. 198) 
Ambiguities and uncertainness play a really significant role here. They enable the 
non-humans to be represented in their "purest form", returning freedoms to the 
non-humans and eliminating the human perspective to the largest extent possible (Yip, 
1980, 1991; Yu，s’ 1997b). In this sense, though human intervention is inevitable, the 
influence of the iiieliminable human perspective is minimized. Nature is no longer 
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simply incorporated and assimilated. 
The self in Wang's object- oriented poems 
The minimization of human perspective is largely due to the passivity of the poet. 
In the object- oriented poems, the poet deletes the concreteness of the self (Yip, 1991; 
Wang, G.Z.[王J, 1986). That is, the poet is not present as a concrete and explicit 
narrator or a dominating center explaining the non-humans. As I will show, the poet's 
passivity is the prerequisite for the interdependent and multi-causal relation between 
human and non-humans in Wang's object- oriented poems. And this deleting of the 
concreteness of the self can be first demonstrated by the absence of subjects in 
Wang's object- oriented poems. 
As discussed, the poet is hidden in Wang's object- oriented poems. The poet is 
not present as a narrator in the poems (Wang, G.Z.[王],1986; Barnstone 1991, Owen, 
1981). The subjects (pronouns) are missing in the object- oriented poems. We 
understand the presence of the poet, not through the poet presented as a subject or a 
narrator, nor through the use of personal pronouns. Rather, we recognize the presence 
of the poet through the use of verbs in the poems (Barnstone, 1991). The words 
"hear" and “see” in “Deer Enclosure" denote the act of a human. Similarly, the word 
“sitting” in “Bamboo Lodge" denotes the presence of human. The poem “Visiting 
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Temple of Gathered Fragrance" itself denotes the presence of the poet as heading 
towards the Temple. The missing subject in these poems is extremely significant in 
that it deletes the concreteness of the poet. The poems are the experience of the poet, 
like sitting in the Bamboo Lodge, mediating in Deer Enclosure and traveling to the 
Temple of Gathered Fragrance. Yet, as Yip ([葉]，1991) argues, the missing subject 
frees the poems from being a singular and specific experience of one person. A 
personal pronoun always tends to specify and concretize the presence of the narrator. 
For instance, compare "Alone I sit amid the dark bamboo" (Yu, 1980, p. 147) with 
"Sitting alone among dark bamboos". The personal pronoun "I" specifies the act to 
one person, the poet. The act of sitting alone becomes concretely the poet's experience. 
In contrast, the absent subject frees the poet from being a concrete narrator. Though 
sitting alone is undeniably a personal experience, the missing subject creates a 
ambiguous and uncertain narrator. The poet becomes non-substantial, or in 
Barnstone's word, the poet "is hidden" (1991, p. li). 
It is important to note that the missing subject not only cancels the concreteness 
of the poet, but also implies the full submergence of the self (Barnstone, 1991; Liu, 
1966; Yip[葉],1980; Wang, G.Z.[王]’ 1986). As stated clearly by Yip, the missing 
subject is not a ‘[c]m-ious habit of mind", but it is a concept of "losing yourself in the 
flux of events' (1997, p.7). The losing of self, the submergence of self, or the stepping 
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aside of the poer ' is to deny the concreteness of self, that is, to recognize human as 
part of the components of the world. 
Before we discuss the meaning of the submergence of self, we have to 
understand the Zen Buddhist concept of sunyata since sunyata is the background to 
understand the importance of the losing of self. Sunyata(空）or "emptiness", is 
significant as it reveals the fundamental relationship between human/ non-humans, or 
even between non-humans in Wang's object- oriented poems (Fu [傅-]，1999). It is 
well known that Wang Wei was a devoted Buddhist. To see Zen Buddhism's influence 
in Wang's poems written in the later part of his life is therefore unexceptional. 一 
Traces of Zen Buddhism are indeed discernible in the poems discussed above. 
Take, for instance, the word "empty" in the first line of "Deer Enclosure". This word 
denotes the unpopulatedness of the mountain, at the same time it also denotes the 
sunyata (空)’ or ‘‘emptiness’’ of the poet. Sunyata marks the embrace of fullness and 
nothingness at the same time. Emptiness highlights the "dependent origination" of the 
world, that is the "interconnected and interdependent structure in the universe" (de 
Silva, 1998, p. 41). What is implied in the "fullness and nothingness" is the 
ever-changingness of the world and the impermanence of things. The appearance of 
one thing is doomed to disappear. This ever-changingness of the world is not 
controlled by human in any sense. Rather, it is the result of the assembly of various 
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conditions and factors, which are non-linear, interconnected and interdependent. 
Thus, to see things as empty does not mean that one cannot see the things, only 
seeing them differently. For instance, to say that one sees a table as empty is to say 
that one recognizes the inherited process of transformation of the table. The formation 
of the table is the result of the assembly of various conditions and factors. First of all, 
a piece of wood has to be cut to make a table. The tree, from which the wood comes is 
dependent on various factors for its growth, like weather and soil. This particular tree 
has to be chosen to make a table. A designer and the market also have to be taken into 
account. Finally the person sees this table by chance. The table is not permanent. It 
will deteriorate and is subject to changes. The deterioration or change of the table, is 
also subject to various conditions and factors. This is the meaning of seeing the table 
as empty. Note that, once we see the table as empty, we also recognize that the 
designer of the table, the wood, the wood-cutter, the weather are all inter-related to a 
certain extent. The table is, then, the result of uncalculated and unpredictable 
interconnections. To say that things are empty is to highlight such multi-causal and 
non-linear relationships. 
Emptiness implies an inter-related and multi-causal relation. Therefore, 
confusion and ambiguities are unavoidable. To claim a clear and simple relationship 
between human and nature is difficult and impossible. What we can say in the least 
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sense to this human/ nature relation is that human and nature is fundamentally 
interdependent and interconnected. Human cannot alter or disrupt the stream of 
interconnection and inter-relatedness. Human is only a part of them (de Silva, 1998). 
If we insist on claiming an independent and concrete selfhood, we forget the fact 
that the self cannot escape from the streams of impermanence and emptiness. In fact, 
there is no such thing as a permanent selfhood (Fu[傅],1999; Yu, 1980; de Silva, 
1998; James, 2004). The self is also not concrete. Selfhood is only the result of the 
assembly of consciousness, feelings and perception (Yip, 1980). When one loses the 
self, one relocates oneself back into the interconnected self-society-nature matrix. 
This is what the poet does in Wang's object- oriented poems. The paradoxical 
presence of the poet in "Deer Enclosure" shows Wang's inclination to "deemphasize 
the human ego" (Yu, 1987, p. 187). The hidden presence of the poet in "Bamboo 
Lodge" can be understood in the same light. The poet tries to minimize himself and 
frees himself from the dominating position. Likewise in "Visiting the Temple of 
Gathered Fragrance", assumption of complete ignorance frees the poet from 
calculation to be one with nature. The unknown, unfamiliar road and the reliance on 
nature to lead make every change and appearance of nature startling and surprising.^^ 
The poet minimizes the self and remains passive. 
Il is precisely because of this stepping aside of the poet that the inter-relations 
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between humans and non-humans are acknowledged. This can be seen in the 
following two examples. 
Magnolia Bank (辛夷塢)24 
木末芙蓉花� On the tips of trees, "lotus" flowers 
1丄I中發紅粤� In the mountains produce red calices. 
•戶；寂無；人� A home by a stream, quiet. No one. 
紛紛開且落 ° Bloom and fall, bloom and fall. 
Bird Call Valley (鳥鳴澗产 
人閒梓；花落� Human at leisure, cassia flowers fall. 
夜P淨春111空。 丁he night still, spring mountain empty. 
月出驚 1 � I 鳥 � The moon emerges, startling mountain birds: 
n寺口鳥春倘；]中 ° At time calling within the spring valley. 
In "Magnolia Bank", the poet does not intervene or disturb the appearance of the lotus 
flower (Yip [葉],1980). Though there is neither subject nor verb to indicate the 
presence of the poet, the poet's presence is presupposed. The poet remains hidden in 
the poem. The words "no one" further accentuates the absence of the poet. With such 
a hidden presence, the poet avoids disrupting the flowers' presentation. The blossoms 
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of the flowers are depicted as //without the poet's intervention. In "Bird Call Valley", 
human presence is registered. Yet the word "leisure" highlights the non-intervention 
and passivity of the poet, or the losing of self.^^ The poet is free from intellectual 
calculation or any business. Significantly, human at leisure and the fall of the flowers 
forms a causal relationship. It is because human is at leisure that he or she feels and 
appreciates the fall of the flowers and hears the birds call (Yip, 1980). This is similar 
to "Deer Enclosure", where the uncertain absence of human is immediately followed 
by the description of nature (Yu, 1987). This is not a coincidence, but a deliberate 
structure highlighting that only when the poet is passive can non-humans be 
represented in their "purest form", and hence their inter-relation. Similarly, in 
"Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance", because the poet is at leisure, away 
from a dominating role, he is surprised by the "sudden" appearance of nature. Hence, 
stepping aside is the pre-requisite and necessary condition for the acknowledgement 
of the inter- relationship between human and non-humans. 
Wang's object- oriented poems thus reveal a strong mutuality between humans 
and non-humans. The ambiguous presence of the poet in "Bird Call Valley", "Deer 
Enclosure", "Bamboo Lodge" and "Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance" 
makes clear that the poet is not the main or sole concern in the poems. Yet, neither are 
the non-humans (Yu, 1980). The deep grove and bright moon in "Bamboo Lodge" 
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appear side by side with the poet's zither and whistle. It is how the poet's zither and 
whistle sounds echo with the deep grove and bright moon that is the main concern of 
the poem (Yu, 1987). Likewise in "Deer Enclosure", the shining sun shares space 
with the voices of human. In "Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance", though no 
human voice is heard, the implied presence of a human creates a picture of "strong 
mutuality" between humans and non-humans (Yu, 1980, p. 168), creating a "world of 
harmony and integration" (Yu, 1980, p.l). This coherent whole and harmonious 
relation forms a “self- nature matrix"^^ where human is but one component at one 
with non-humans in an interrelated web. This interrelated web-like self/ nature 
relationship is even more explicit when we see non-humans interacting among 
themselves in Wang's object- oriented poems. 
Interactions between non-humans in Wang's object- oriented poems 
Non-humans in Wang's poems are active, which can be best explained and 
demonstrated by the usage of verbs in the poems. For instance, in "Deer Enclosure", 
the word "shines" suggests the interaction between sun and the green moss. Even 
more clearly, the words "comes to shine" in "Bamboo Lodge" indicate that the moon 
takes the initiative. These verbs suggest that non-humans interact with one another. A 
more explicit example can be found in "Visiting the Temple of Gathered Fragrance" 
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couplet "Noise from the spring swallows up lofty rocks; The color of the sun chills 
green pines”（泉聲咽危石。曰色冷青松 ° ). In Visiting the Temple of Gathered 
Fragrance", the verb "swallow" and "chill" indicate clearly the action and interaction 
among the non-humans. "Nature becomes active" (Barnstone, 1991, p. I). The verbs 
in the poems suggest that not only human but non-humans also "act". Likewise, in the 
line "The moon emerges, startling mountain birds"(月出^黧山,^� ) in “Bird Call 
Valley", the word "emerge" suggests that the emergence of the moon influences, j 
startles the bird.^^ A very clear interaction among the non-humans is indicated. 
Interactions, then, are not limited to humans; non-humans also interact among 
themselves. This further re-accentuates the non-dominating role of the poet and 
complicates the human/ nature relationship. Humans and the non-humans are all knots 
in the "self- nature matrix". Within this “self- nature matrix", interactions take place 
between humans, between humans and non-humans, and between non-humans 
themselves. Hence, relationships are not merely formed between human/ human or 
human/ nature, but also between non- humans/ non- humans. This extends the “self-
nalLire matrix” beyond the limited human/ non-humans perspective; the "self- nature 
matrix" in fact consists of many layers. The human/ nature relationship is only one of 
the layers in the "self- nature matrix". Human is but one of many components in the 
human/ nature layer, which is also one of the many layers in the "self- nature matrix". 
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Based on this argument we can understand the real meaning of the minimization 
of self in Wang's object- oriented poems. The minimization of self is an attempt to 
re-position human (or self as an individual) into the "self- nature matrix". This is not 
simply a human-nature web but a more complex and multi-related web, where 
humans and non-humans are only two of the important components. Human and 
non-humans are also one in the "self- nature matrix". By this, I do not mean that there 
are no differences between them. Interactions among non-humans sufficiently show 
that non-humans are distinct entities, entities different from humans. What I want to 
suggest is that humans do not assume a dominating role. Humans and non-humans are 
different entities (components) in the "self- nature matrix", where all entities are 
inter-related in a multi- causal way. Human is important only because it provides a 
necessary position in understanding the "self- nature matrix". And it is this 
inter-related relationship in Wang's object- oriented poems that responds to both Self 
Realization and the relational self. 
Wang's non- masculinist self and the relational self 
Before explaining how the self/ nature relationship in Wang's object- oriented 
poems responds to both Self Realization and ecofeminist's relational self, I want to 
clarify some points. First, I am not suggesting that the self account in Wang's object-
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oriented poems is the only alternative. Nor am 1 suggesting that deep ecology or 
ecofeminism must follow Wang's account of self. All I want to suggest is that the self/ 
nature relationship in Wang's object- oriented poems offers a well- grounded 
"alternative" understanding that resolves the respective problems in deep ecology's 
Self Realization and ecofeminism's relational self exposed in the deep ecology/ 
ecofeminism debate. 
First, the self in Wang's object- oriented poems does not formulate a 
problematical diialistic relationship, which continues to inform deep ecology's notion 
of Self Realization. As shown in the previous chapter. Self Realization has been 
criticized as being masculinist because of its failure to affirm difference as well as 
continuity. To ecofeminists, Self Realization succeeds in affirming continuity to 
counter hyperseparation, but fails to acknowledge the importance of difference in 
countering incorporation. To affirm difference, one has to respect non-humans as an 
"other", to realize and respect the agency of non-humans. The self in Wang's object-
oriented poems arguably actualizes this respect, hence overcoming the problems of 
Self Realization. In the non-linear and multi-causal relation in Wang's object- oriented 
poems, humans (the self) and non-humans co- exist as components in a "self- nature 
matrix". This humans (self)/ nature relation is neither diialistic nor hierarchical. The 
relation is not established through excluding others, but through recognition of being 
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one of the components in the inter-related and multi-causal web. Difference is also 
affirmed in this recognition. Humans do not occupy the dominating center, creating a 
problematic and dualistic relation with nature. It is in this light that the self in Wang's 
poems clearly provides a non- masculinist alternative to Self Realization. 
At the same time, the self in Wang's object- oriented poems also suggests an 
alternative grounding of a human- nature relation that resonates with the relational 
self but escapes its problems. First of all, let us recall ecofeminism's problems of 
grounding the relational self in a women- nature connection here. Though 
acknowledged to be important, the women- nature connection is difficult to define 
and develop for ecofeminism as it entails a definite notion of femininity. It is unclear 
on what grounds such a femininity can be defined. It is also questionable of what 
genuine femininity is. Confronting this problem, some ecofeminists resort to 
biological determinism. Yet, such attempt to ground the women- nature connection on 
biological determinism is often criticized for universalizing "women" and 
"femininity". Thus ecofeminism is at an impasse. On the one hand, those ecofeminists 
who shy away from biological determinism fail to clarify femininity and find a 
ground for the women- nature connection. On the other hand, those who seek such a 
grounding in biological determinism suffer from another problems of universalization 
and essentializism. 
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Besides these problems of defining femininity and establishing the women-
nature connection, it is also questionable how re- valuing femininity can counter 
masculinism. If feminine virtues are affirmed to complement masculinism (without 
rejecting masculinism), they remain as more than complements in support of 
masculinism. If feminine virtues substitutes masculine values, there is only a reversal 
of the dualistic hierarchy into emotion over mind, leaning the problematical dualistic 
structure in place. Confronting this problem, Plumwood suggests of finding a third ； 
alternative, a different account of closeness to nature that encompasses the dual 
recognition of continuity and difference in the relational self. The self/ nature account 
of Wang's object- oriented poems arguably offers such a "third alternative". 
Significantly, the self/ nature relationship in Wang's object- oriented poems 
meets the vision of the relational self in overcoming the problems of dualism. The 
problems of dualism, which include hyperseparation, homogenization, incorporation 
and instrumental ism, no longer apply with the affirmation of continuity and difference. 
In the self/ nature relationship in Wang's object- oriented poems, the accordance of 
activity to non-humans independent of humans indicates that non-humans are not 
incorporated and homogenized. Difference is affirmed. As the same time, continuity is 
affirmed in the web-1 ike relationship depicted in Wang's object- oriented poems, 
where both human and non-humans are two of the interdependent components in the 
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self- nature matrix. The self/ nature relationship in this self- nature matrix is multi-
causal and non- linear. With such recognition of continuity and difference between 
humans and non-humans, the self in Wang's object- oriented poems clearly features 
key elements of the relational self. 
Yet, I am not suggesting that the self/ nature relationship found in Wang's object-
oriented poems is the relational self, nor am I trying to fit the self/ nature relationship 
found in Wang's object- oriented poems into the relational self. In fact, to fit the self/ 
nature account in Wang's object- oriented poems into the relational self is unrealistic. 
The two, as we have discussed, are different self/ nature accounts fundamentally. For 
instance, whereas the relational self suggests a subject/ subject relationship, it is 
impossible to conclude from Wang's object- oriented poems that non-humans are also 
subjects or agential. Furthermore, as argued above, the ambiguities and uncertainties 
in Wang's poems indicate a minimization of the poet's rational imposition, enabling a 
return of freedoms to non-humans and a representation of non-humans in their "purest 
form". Herein seems to lay another important parallel with the relational self, which 
also escapes the privileging of rationality. However, while the relational self's 
rejection of rationality is based largely on the reason/ nature dualism, the 
minimization of rational self in Wang's object- oriented poems is made on a different 
ground. 
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If we further look into the issue of gender, the two accounts of self/ nature 
relationships may seem to be more controversial. It is true that we are unable to 
conclude that the self account in Wang's object- oriented poems is either feminine or 
masculine. The issue of femininity and masculinism does not apply in Wang's poems. 
Unlike the relational self and ecofeminism, the self account in Wang's object- oriented 
poems does not formulate a relation with gender. For instance, the lines in "Bird Call 
Valley", “Human at leisure, cassia flowers f a l l "(人閒桂花落 ° ), or in "Deer 
Enclosure", "Empty mountain: no human is s e e n " (空山不見人� ) , o r in ‘‘Bamboo 
Lodge，’，‘‘Grove so deep, human do not know"(深林人不知卜）all refer to humans, but 
the Chinese word "human"(人）does not suggest a specific gender. This absence of a 
specific indication of gender in Wang's object- oriented poems suggests a possibility 
of overcoming the problem of the relational self's reliance on a gender grounding. 
Though one may argue that there is an implicit gender bias in Wang's object- oriented 
poems or that the self account in Wang's object- oriented poems overlooks the 
difference between women and men, these possible criticisms make clear how the 
self/ nature account in Wang's object- oriented poems offer an alternative formulation 
of the relational self. If these criticisms are valid, then interestingly, the self/ nature 
account in Wang's object- oriented poems is a gender- biased account which can 
avoid subject/ object dualisms and avoid being masculinist, while at the same time 
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achieving the same end as the relational self. Even if the self/ nature account in 
Wang's object- oriented poems is gender- biased, it is a gender- biased account which 
is able to free itself from the problems of being masculinist, contradictory as it may 
seem. Relying on a different grounding than ecofeminism's relational self, it 
nonetheless affirms both continuity and differences between the self and nature, just 
like ecofeminism's relational self. It is precisely the different groundings of the self/ 
nature account in Wang's object- oriented poems from the relational self that is 
valuable for our discussion. There is no need to include any feminine virtues or 
masculine virtues, or stick to an essentializing women- nature connection to achieve 
the relational self's closeness to nature. Whether it is gender-biased or not, the 
continuity and difference between human (self) and nature can still be affirmed. The 
issue of being gender- biased then no longer matters for the specific question at hand.. 
In sum, the self account in Wang's object- oriented poems can be read as an 
alternative to the relational self escapes the problematical women- nature grounding. 
It achieves the continuity and difference in the relational self with a different 
grounding and approach. What I am trying to suggest in this thesis is that, as the 
relational self proposed by ecofeminism to counter deep ecology's is trapped in an 
impasse, calling for a third alternative, the self/ nature relationship in Wang's object-
oriented poems offers a "different concept of closeness to nature" that ecofeminism 
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seeks (Plumwood, 1990, p. 232). The self/ nature relationship in Wang's object-
oriented poems parallels in affirming both continuity and difference between the self 
and nature. Yet, while the relational self cannot be clearly established without the 
problematic grounding of an essential women- nature connection, the self/ nature 
relationship in Wang's object- oriented poems is clearly accounted for with no 
recourse to essentialized gender assumptions. In this sense, the self/ nature account in 
Wang's object- oriented poems may be read as one possible alternative to 
ecofeminism's relational self. 
To recapitulate, the self account in Wang's object- oriented poems offers a way 
out of the debate between deep ecology and ecofeminism. It offers an alternative that 
escapes the masculinity bias of deep ecology's Self Realization as well as the 
problematical gender grounding of ecofeminism's relational self. It achieves the same 
ends of the relational self — to achieve continuity and difference with nature — on 
a different ground. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis begins with the anthropocentrism/ androcentrism debate, where 
problems and causes of the current environmental causes are discussed, and the power 
structure between human and nature, men and women are revealed. In the debate, 
deep ecology and ecofeminism indicate different readings of the problems of 
anthropocentrism. Deep ecology holds that anthropocentrism refers to human's 
regarding non-humans as mere instruments. Ecofeminism, on the other hand, rejects 
this view of anthropocentrism. To ecofeminism, the domination of women and the 
domination of nature (and other oppressions such as race and class) are inter-related. 
The recognition of the inter-relatedness between oppressions enables one to realize 
the problematical dualistic structure behind all oppressions. To ecofeminism, deep 
ecology errs in failing to see through the connections between all oppressions. 
Ecofeminism calls this more "in-depth" reading of the problems the "liberation model 
of anthropocentrism" or simply "androcentrism". 
Regarding the problem of anthropocentrism, deep ecology proposes a new self/ 
nature relationship model to highlight the connection between human and nature. In 
Self Realization, through identification, humans come to acknowledge their internal 
relationship with nature, where the intrinsic value of non-humans is realized. 
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Non-humans are no longer seen as mere matter. Yet, to ecofeminism, Self Realization 
is masculinist. As ecofeminism illustrates, to overcome dualism, we have to affirm 
both continuity and difference. Yet, Self Realization only succeeds in accentuating 
continuity but fails to acknowledge difference. To ecofeminism, there is no difference 
between such Self Realization and the masculinist incorporation and subsumption of 
non-humans. 
Although ecofeminism gives a detailed criticism of Self Realization, it fails to 
provide a well- grounded account of self/ nature relationship. Much has been written 
on the characteristics of the relational self, the ecofeminists' proposed account of self/ 
nature relationship based on the recognition of continuity and difference, yet, it is a 
self/ nature relationship without grounds. This has to be attributed to the problems of 
ecofeminisms' own grounding. Women- nature connection is the basic grounding of 
ecofeminism. Many ecofeminists believe that the women- nature connection (which is 
taken to define femininity most of the time) provides an alternative to the current 
masculinist model. Yet, this women- nature grounding is highly problematical. First, it 
is impossible to generalize and define "femininity". Second, it is questionable how 
revaluating femininity can respond to masculinism. Substituting masculinism by 
femininity will only result in the reversal of dualism, femininity/ masculinism. 
Femininity complementing masculinism is equally undesirable since this will reduce 
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femininity to the complementary roles in supporting masculinism. It is because of 
these unsolved questions that the women- nature connection remains highly 
problematical. As ecofeminist Plumwood also fails to escape these problems when 
proposing the relational self, she refrains from linking between the women- nature 
connection with the relational self, leaving the relational self without grounds. I 
suggest in this thesis that the self account found in Wang's object- oriented poems 
may contribute to resolving this problem of the relational self. 
I find that the self/ nature relationship in Wang's object- oriented poems 
coincides with the relational self in some important aspects. First, in Wang's object-
oriented poems, humans and nature are inter-connected in the self- nature- society 
matrix. In this matrix, humans do not occupy the dominating position, existing only as 
interrelated components with non-humans in the web. Continuity is thus affirmed. 
Second, in Wang's object- oriented poems, non-humans interact among themselves, 
revealing that non-humans are different entities in the self- nature- society matrix. As 
such, difference is also affirmed. With this agreement with the relational self, the self/ 
nature relationship in Wang's object- oriented poems provides a "relational self with 
a different ground and approach than the women- nature connection that ecofeminism 
finds difficult to establish. In this sense, the self/ nature account in Wang's object-
oriented poems achieves the relational self's end with different means. The self 
84 
account in Wang's object- oriented poems provides a possible alternative to achieve 
the non-dualistic and non- masculinist sense of self/ nature relationship. 
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Endnotes 
1 The term "deep ecology- ecofeminism debate" is first coined by Fox in his essay 
“The deep ecology- ecofeminism debate and its parallels" (Fox, 2001, p. 218). 
2 There are two ways in which Chinese poetry portrays the relationship between the 
poet and the objects (non-humans) (Yip [葉]’ 1980). One of the major characteristics 
of the first way is the imposition of the poet's intellectual knowledge to the 
non-humans. Non-humans are then transformed into concepts. In contrast, in the 
second way, the poet does not occupy a dominating role and non-humans are 
represented as if in their "purest form" (Yip, 1997b, p. 13). I translate the terms of the 
first way as "poet- centric" and the second way as "object- oriented". These will be 
further explained in detail in chapter three. 
3 The term "non-humans" almost works identical with the term nature in this thesis. 
4 For convenience sake, in this thesis, I will mainly follow ecofeminism's criticisms 
of deep ecology, since this is how the debate got started. 
^ To Naess, deep ecology is open to reader's elaboration and interpretation in that 
"readers are encouraged to elaborate their own versions of deep ecology, clarify key 
concepts, and think through the consequences of acting from these principles" (1995a, 
p. 49). Hence, the specific meaning of deep ecology varies among different deep 
ecologists. For instance, Fox's deep ecology is different from Naess's ecosophy T (T 
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stands for Naess's "mountain hut Tvergastein") over the issue of Self Realization in 
that Fox puts special attention on the transcendence of self (Naess, 1989, p. 4). This 
will be further developed in the later part of the thesis. 
6 Based on these two principles, Naess develops a 8-points "platform of the deep 
ecology movement" to support practical environmental actions and debate: 
(1) The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The 
value of non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for 
narrow human purposes. 
(2) Richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the 
flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth. 
(3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital 
needs. 
(4) Present human interference with the non-human would is excessive, and the 
situation is rapidly worsening. 
(5) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial 
decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a 
decrease. 
(6) Significant change of life conditions for the better requires change in policies. 
These affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. 
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(7) The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in 
situations of intrinsic value) rather than adhering to a high standard of living. There 
will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. 
(8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or 
indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes. (1989, p. 
29) 
7 Deborah Slicer criticizes deep ecology as having a "very shallow understanding" of 
ecofeminism that deep ecology misrepresents ecofeminism (1995, p. 155). As Slicer 
criticized, deep ecologist Fox only understands "the ecofeminism" which has been 
filtered by "two male writers, Michael Zimmerman and Jim Cheney" (p. 152). She 
questions why Fox relies on the readings of two male writers instead of focusing on 
the writings by other dominant female ecofeminists. 
8 According to Plumwood, this dualistic structure can also explain the hierarchical 
structure between colonizer/ colonized, men/ women and human/ nature dualisms. 
To most ecofeminists, the women- nature connection is automatically equal to 
feminine values or femininity. For instance, To Salleh (1984), the women- nature 
connection equals to feminine virtues such as childbirth and motherhood. Though 
Plumwood (1990) is not explicit, it is apparent that the women- nature connection 
equals to femininity in her essay. 
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� As indicated in the essay title, "Still fooling with mother nature", Cuomo (2001) 
criticizes Salleh for failing to problematize gender, and confining femininity to mere 
motherhood. Due to this emphasis on motherhood, Scandilands even names 
ecofeminism as "motherhood environmentalism" (Scandilands, 1999, p. xiii). 
11 Though it is unclear of how Eisler defines "femininity", she highlights the 
importance of the re-affirmation of female and femininity in her essay (1990). 
12 Noteworthily, masculinism and femininity here refers to the issue of traits of 
"human ideal"; as masculinism sets the human traits, to be a human means to be a 
man. 
13 Some other ecofeminists focus on the empirical connections between women and 
nature, (for example Warren, 1997; Diamond, 1990; Allen, 1990; Shiva, 1990) One of 
the leading figures, Vandana Shiva (1988, 1990) focuses on the first world/ third 
world development. She proposes that development is a process of colonization, as 
development is equated with western progress. In the process of development, 
anything which does not produce profit is being regarded as unproductive. Women's 
productivity has been destroyed by the destruction and removal of land, water and 
forests. Women, together with nature and the tribal and peasant societies are seen as 
unproductive and ought to be abandoned. 
Some ecofeminists have grounded their discussion on cultural and social context. An 
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example given by King is the fight and revolution held by Indian women, called 
“Chipko Andolcm (the hugging movement)" (King, p. 118). It is a movement aiming at 
the protection of the forest. To resist the land reform in India, women hug trees, using 
their bodies to resist bulldozers. This non- violence movement soon spread through 
the whole India in 1970s and 1980s. The point King argues here is that the whole 
campaign was held by women, men on the other hand joined in the governmental 
force. "[W]omen have been at the forefront of every historical, political movement to 
reclaim the Earth" that women are in fact "closer to nature than men" (King, 1990, p. 
118; King, 1993, p. 70). 
I"* Plumwood (1991, 1993) also criticizes Fox's transpersonal ecology as creating a 
transcendental self and hence being masculinist. As explained above, Fox particularly 
advocates for the ontological and cosmological levels of identification, as he believes, 
personally based identification may lead to war and destruction. Plumwood finds such 
a transcendent self problematic in two ways. First, this transcendent self is a kind of 
devaluation of personal relationship, emotions and sensibility, which reproduces the 
dualistic devaluation brought by rationality. So far as deep ecology fails to recognize 
the fact that rationality justifies the superior group's dualistic exclusion of others, the 
problematic human/ nature and men/ women dualisms remain. Second, to transcend 
the concrete world and drive for something transcendental and abstract are the 
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characteristics of the masculine self. 
15 I adhere to Yip's ([葉]1980, 1991) and Yu (1987; 1980)'s analyses in this thesis. 
16 Though the poet Wang Wei is a male, the self found in the poems does not 
necessarily indicate a difference in gender. It is hence important to acknowledge for 
the openness of this vagueness of gender in the poems. 
17 Translation adapted from Yip (1997a, p. 225) 
18 Translation adapted from Yu (1980, p. 204) and Yip (1997a, p.226) 
19 Translation adapted from Yu (1980, p. 145) and Yip (1997a, p. 189) 
20 Yip [葉]points out the significance of the flexibility of Chinese to the ambiguity 
and vagueness in Chinese poems: first, the absence of subjects and objects in Chinese 
and second, the missing of conjunction words. (1980, 1991 [葉]，1997b) The missing 
subjects and objects in Chinese open up the possibilities of the references. In contrast, 
the necessary subject and object indicated in the English fail to demonstrate the 
vagueness. For instance, English does not allow for the absence of the subject in a 
sentence. Both ‘‘Deer Enclosure" and "Bamboo Lodge" are absent of a definite and 
specific subject. In the third line of "Bamboo Lodge", both subject and object in the 
phase "do not know" are unspecified and unsaid. The phrase "do not know" can refer 
to the subject who “do not know", to the object that someone do not know about the 
deep wood. Another example can be found in "Visiting the Temple of Gathered 
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Fragrance". In the phrase ‘‘Ancient trees, paths without people", it is unknown if the 
word "path" or the word "people" is the predicate of the sentence. Hence, it can be 
read in at least two ways, path without people or without a human path. It is this 
flexibility of Chinese that helps to preserve the multiplicities and vagueness of the 
poems. 
Furthermore, the indeterminateness in the poems is due to the missing of conjunction 
words and the indicative words in the poems. For instance, when connectives or 
indicative words are added in "Visiting Temple of Gathered Fragrance", the poem 
immediately results in a logical and linear meaning. Take the first two couplets as 
examples: “I do know the Temple of Gathered Fragrance, I walk miles and miles into 
cloud-peaks. In a place where ancient trees and paths without people, I hear bell rains 
deep in the mountain." In this translation, with the addition of connective words, 
meanings are immediately reduced to one. 
21 The losing of self, the submergence of self, or the stepping aside of the poet are 
synonymous in this thesis. These words are used to describe the non-concreteness, 
passivity and non-intervention of the poet. 
22 Indeed, to analyze Wang's poetry without taking Buddhism into account will only 
result in a superficial analysis (Yu, 1980; Chen [陳]，1993). 
23 
More examples can be found in Wang Wei's poetry. For instance, "Stone Gate 
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Monastery on Mt. Lantian"(藍田山石門精舍）is similar to "Visiting the Temple of 
Gathered Fragrance", where the poet lets himself led by nature. 
Translation adapted from Yu (1980, p. 204) and Yip (1997a, p.228) 
Translation adapted from Yu (1980, p. 200) 
For more examples see, for example, "In Response to Vice-Magistrate Zhang"(酬| 
張少府)，"Green Creek"(青溪). 
27 This term is adapted from de Silva's "self-society-nature matrix" or 
"hiiman-society-nature matrix" (1998, p. 30). The term revises the term nature with 
particular emphasis on, first, as de Silva quotes Bernard Williams, the "ineliminable 
human's perspective" (1998, p.30). And second, this term is significant in depicting 
the multi- causal and inter-related human/ nature relationship I described in Wang's 
poems. Yet, the context in Wang's poems seems not including the discussion of 
society, the term is hence revised as "self- nature matrix" in this thesis. 
1 More examples can be found in "Clear Bamboo Range"(斤竹嶺)："Tall and dense, 
they gleam by the empty riverbend; Azure-green, billowing, flowing waves."(檀欒映 
空曲。青翠漾漣漪 °) (Yu, p. 202); "Dwelling in the Mountains: An Autumn Evening" 
(1�I居秋瞑)：‘The bright moon, amid the pines, shines. The clear stream, over rocks, 
flows.”（明月松間照。清泉石上流 o ) (Yu, p. 196-197); and "Green Creek"(青溪)： 
"Tossing lightly, water chestnuts float; Clear and still, reeds and rushes gleam."(、漾、漾 
93 
讽菱符。澄澄映葭葦° ) (Yu, p. 190) 
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